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TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT DISCOVERY 
Aaron D. Simowitz* 
 
Joseph Stiglitz described the current Argentine sovereign debt crisis as 
“America throwing a bomb into the global economic system.”1  And yet, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided to tackle only one head of this massive hydra.  
Presented with numerous issues arising from the controversy, the Court 
granted certiorari only on the issue of whether the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) blocked Argentina’s creditors from obtaining 
discovery of Argentina’s worldwide financial transactions.  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the Court, concluded that because the FSIA says nothing on its 
face about discovery—it says nothing about discovery. 
But the majority did not grapple with the worldwide nature of the 
discovery granted.  It assumed, without deciding, that worldwide discovery 
in aid of enforcement of a judgment is usually appropriate.  This prompted 
Justice Ginsburg to dissent.  Justice Ginsburg wrote that U.S. courts should 
not assume that the “sky may be the limit” for post-judgment discovery, 
especially given that other countries typically have far more limited 
document production.  For Justice Ginsburg, discovery in aid of 
enforcement of a judgment is presumptively about U.S. courts looking to 
U.S. law about assets in the United States. 
The split in the Court reflects deep confusion and disagreement among 
U.S. courts on the role of discovery in an era of worldwide hunts for assets 
to satisfy unpaid judgments and arbitral awards.  Courts have struggled to 
define the limits of worldwide enforcement discovery for one overriding 
reason:  U.S. courts—following the Supreme Court’s lead—have applied 
tests and concepts developed for pretrial discovery to the very different 
world of post-judgment enforcement discovery.  Post-judgment enforcement 
discovery differs in its purposes, its presumptions, and its problems.  This 
Article grapples with each and proposes new approaches to tackling two 
obstacles to enforcement discovery—restrictions on discovery and on 
execution. 
 
*  Fellow, New York University School of Law; Lecturer in Law, Columbia Law School.  I 
owe great thanks to Linda Silberman, Franco Ferrari, Richard Epstein, Pamela Bookman, 
and the participants in the New York University Lawyering Colloquium for their insightful 
comments, suggestions, and critiques.  I also owe special thanks to Teresa Teng and Neto 
D.C.B. Waite for their exceptional research assistance.  I am also indebted to my wife for her 
input, patience, and support. 
 
 1. Peter Eavis & Alexandra Stevenson, Argentina Finds Relentless Foe in Paul 
Singer’s Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 30, 2014, 10:35 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/in-hedge-fund-argentina-finds-relentless-foe/. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judgments matter.  When a court renders a money judgment, it states that 
a defendant has breached its obligations under a sovereign’s public or 
private law.  The court empowers the plaintiff—now the creditor—to 
demand payment from the defendant—now the debtor.  The creditor is 
likewise empowered to seize the debtor’s assets and to sell them to the 
highest bidder.  The creditor can take this judgment to the courts of other 
sovereigns and expect that they too will grant it these extensive powers over 
the debtor. 
And yet courts and scholars have underestimated or ignored the 
differences between the pretrial and post-judgment worlds.  In Republic of 
Argentina v. NML Capital,2 both the majority opinion and Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent exhibit a failure to appreciate the significant difference 
between pretrial merits discovery and discovery in aid of enforcement.  This 
is not exceptional but rather symptomatic of U.S. courts’ tendency to treat 
enforcement discovery like garden-variety merits discovery.  This failure 
has led to widespread confusion and disagreement—on display in the 
clashing NML opinions—particularly when parties seeking transnational 
 
 2. 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014). 
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enforcement discovery are faced with obstacles interposed by foreign 
sovereigns. 
This Article is the first to assess the fundamental differences between 
merits and enforcement discovery—different purposes, different standards 
of relevance, and different due process interests, to name just a few 
examples.  To this point, U.S. courts have struggled to formulate clear 
standards for transnational enforcement discovery due to the unwarranted 
reliance on concepts developed for pretrial merits discovery.  New 
standards proposed here will permit new answers to a classic conflict in 
transnational discovery—conflicts with foreign statutes restricting 
discovery—and to the emerging conflict highlighted by the dueling NML 
opinions—conflicts with statutes restricting seizures of assets. 
In NML, a group of U.S.-based hedge funds obtained judgments against 
Argentina totaling approximately $1.7 billion.3  U.S. federal courts became 
the battleground for the dispute, taking up numerous questions, including 
the interpretation of the sovereign debt instruments that gave rise to the 
judgments, the ability of a U.S. court to enjoin the actions of a foreign 
sovereign, and the power of a U.S. court to order discovery into sovereign 
assets throughout the world.4  Argentina submitted certiorari petitions on 
each of these issues.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted only the petition on 
the question of discovery.5 
The Court decided the case narrowly, holding that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act6 (FSIA) said nothing on its face about discovery—and 
therefore had nothing to say about discovery.7  But the NML opinions 
highlighted a deeper conflict on the role of extraterritorial asset discovery.  
The seven-Justice majority assumed, without deciding, that extraterritorial 
asset discovery was essentially always appropriate.  Justice Ginsburg 
dissented.  She noted that post-judgment asset discovery must be “relevant” 
to the enforcement of the judgment.8  If an asset cannot be seized, sold, and 
applied to the judgment, discovery of that asset cannot be “relevant” to 
satisfaction of the judgment.  From this premise, she reached two 
conclusions:  first, that U.S. courts should presumptively look to U.S. law to 
govern what assets are subject to seizure, even if the assets are located 
abroad, and second, that whatever a foreign court may do in enforcing a 
U.S. judgment is not “relevant” to the U.S. judgment.9  In other words, a 
U.S. judgment is about what happens in the United States, to assets in the 
United States, under U.S. law. 
 
 3. Sophia Pearson, Singer Seeks Order to Keep Argentine Lawyer in U.S., BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 5, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-05/singer-
seeks-order-to-keep-argentine-lawyer-in-u-s-. 
 4. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 5. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2254. 
 6. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified in 28 U.S.C §§ 1330, 1602–
1611). 
 7. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2256–58. 
 8. Id. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 9. See id.; infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
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This is a local, territorial view of enforcement discovery.  The great 
weight of authority from the lower U.S. courts paints a different picture.10  
Most lower courts see themselves as actively engaged in helping their 
judgment creditors seek out assets around the world—appointing 
themselves, as one NML district court did, as “clearinghouse[s]” for 
information on all the debtor’s assets.11  This approach looks both home 
and abroad for any avenues that could lead to satisfaction of the judgment.  
Accordingly, these courts see few limitations, if any, on extraterritorial 
asset discovery.  This is a transnational view of enforcement—that 
judgment enforcement is, by nature, likely to be transnational. 
No court or scholar has directly addressed this tension to resolve when 
and whether a court should order worldwide enforcement discovery.  
Indeed, these questions are unanswerable without a better understanding of 
how extraterritorial asset discovery serves the aims of the judgment 
enforcement system—a subject also unexplored by courts or scholars.  
Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman identified the bedrock purposes 
of the judgment enforcement system in their seminal work on recognition of 
foreign judgments, among them a “concern to protect the successful 
litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant, from harassing or evasive tactics on 
the part of his previously unsuccessful opponent” and “a policy against 
making the availability of local enforcement the decisive element, as a 
practical matter, in the plaintiff’s choice of forum.”12 
A robust presumption in favor of extraterritorial asset discovery certainly 
contributes to the certainty and expedition of satisfying judgments.  But the 
importance of court-ordered discovery in this process was heavily debated 
in the NML litigation (and also unremarked on by the Supreme Court).  On 
this subject, the irreconcilable adversaries turned suddenly humble, with 
Argentina arguing that the funds had done a masterful job locating assets 
without court-ordered discovery and the funds countering that they never 
could have found any assets without the courts’ timely assistance.13  In the 
modern era of judgment enforcement, where the assets at issue are far more 
likely to be intangible—such as brokerage accounts, LLC interests, and 
electronic funds transfers—enforcement discovery has redoubled 
importance.14 
Von Mehren and Trautman’s less obvious purpose for judgment 
enforcement—that the forum of adjudication should not be yoked to the 
 
 10. See infra notes 82–101 and accompanying text. 
 11. See NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2254. 
 12. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign 
Adjudications:  A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1603–04 
(1968). 
 13. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6–8, NML, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), 
2013 WL 122883; Brief in Opposition at 7, NML, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), 2013 WL 
8479866; see also id. at 21–22 (“[I]f creditors cannot obtain the information needed to locate 
even non-immune assets to satisfy a judgment in their favor—despite having won the case 
on the merits—then enforcement against a recalcitrant sovereign such as Argentina becomes 
nearly impossible.”). 
 14. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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location of the debtor’s assets—has profound implications for transnational 
enforcement discovery.  It counsels that courts rendering a judgment should 
take an active role in locating assets in other jurisdictions, guiding judgment 
creditors to where they can pursue satisfaction of their judgment.  The 
importance of the judgment rendering court as guide is magnified where 
other jurisdictions will refuse to enforce a judgment without a jurisdictional 
nexus (for example, a showing that the debtor has property in the 
jurisdiction) or will charge the creditor sometimes steep fees to recognize 
the foreign judgment.15 
Argentina and its central bank, itself a target of extraterritorial asset 
discovery, also strongly objected to the New York federal court appointing 
itself the “clearinghouse” for all information on Argentina’s assets, in 
whatever country, in whomever’s hands.16  The New York court did not 
examine its authority to take this step—but it would have found itself the 
latest in a long, but not unbroken, line of courts to do so.  The great weight 
of authority is that, where asset discovery is concerned, United States courts 
treat enforcement as transnational, enthusiastically searching for assets 
around the world.  In the context of arbitration awards, scholars, arbitrators, 
and courts have become quite comfortable with the notion that arbitrators 
and courts at the seat of arbitration should take an active role in ensuring 
enforceability of the award.17  Enforcement of arbitral awards is, unlike 
judgments, the subject of a widely adopted treaty, the New York 
Convention.18  But this does not necessarily mean that a judgment, 
conversely, is territorially bounded in nature.  Indeed, many U.S. states 
have adopted comparatively generous judgment enforcement laws in the 
express hope that their judgments will be liberally enforced abroad.19  The 
question is therefore not:  When should extraterritorial asset discovery be 
granted?  But:  When should it be refused? 
 
 15. See, e.g., Wolfgang Wurmnest, Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Money 
Judgments in Germany, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 175, 198–200 (2005) (discussing costs and 
requirements of enforcing foreign money judgments in Germany); see also Yves P. Piantino, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Money Judgments Between the United States and 
Switzerland:  An Analysis of the Legal Requirements and Case Law, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 91, 133–36 (1997). 
 16. Corrected Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 16, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of 
Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), 2011 WL 5967280 (“[T]he district court held a 
second hearing on the pending motions at which it declared that it could serve as ‘a 
clearinghouse for information . . . that might lead to attachments or executions anywhere in 
the world.’  In expressing this view, the court disregarded the fact that the attachments NML 
has sought ‘anywhere in the world’ have, in almost every case, as described above, been 
denied by the courts of those foreign jurisdictions.” (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)). 
 17. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS 920 (2d ed. 2001); DAVID D. CARON ET AL., THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION 
RULES:  A COMMENTARY 53 (2006). 
 18. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention], implemented 
by An Act to Implement the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 
(2012)). 
 19. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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This is the immediate question that drove Justice Ginsburg to dissent 
from an otherwise unanimous opinion in NML.  Justice Ginsburg stated that 
a “court in the United States has no warrant to indulge the assumption that, 
outside our country, the sky may be the limit for attaching a foreign 
sovereign’s property in order to execute a U.S. judgment against the foreign 
sovereign,” and that, “[u]nless and until” the judgment creditor can show 
that foreign law would permit the execution on the debtor’s assets, “I would 
be guided by the one law we know for sure—our own.”20 
The Court’s diverging viewpoints highlighted that there is no established 
conflict of laws framework for when extraterritorial asset discovery should 
be granted or refused.  Extraterritorial enforcement discovery typically can 
encounter two obstacles:  restrictions on discovery (immunity from 
disclosure) and restrictions on execution (immunity from seizure and sale). 
The Court has set down two prominent markers on the questions of when 
American pretrial discovery should overcome foreign restrictions.  In 
Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. 
Rogers,21 the Court overturned sanctions for failure to comply with a 
document production order because “petitioner’s failure to satisfy fully the 
requirements of this production order was due to inability fostered neither 
by its own conduct nor by circumstances within its control,” as it is “hardly 
debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for 
nonproduction.”22  However, in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale 
v. United States District Court,23 the Court emphasized that a foreign law 
prohibition does not necessarily excuse compliance with an American 
production order.24  The Court stated that “[i]t is well settled that such 
[foreign blocking] statutes do not deprive an American court of the power 
to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though 
the act of production may violate that statute.”25 
Since Aerospatiale, courts and commentators have extensively explored 
the reach and limits of transnational pretrial discovery.  Neither courts nor 
commentators have explored the reach and limits of post-judgment 
discovery.  Indeed, when courts have confronted the issue, they have 
attempted to apply, without modification, the rules developed for pretrial 
discovery.  But post-judgment discovery is a far different creature, with its 
own purposes, procedures, and problems.  At a minimum, the test 
announced in Aerospatiale must be substantially modified to account for 
the facts that a debtor resisting production is presumably acting in bad faith 
by refusing to pay or bond a judgment, that the remedies available for bad 
faith behavior pretrial—such as contempt sanctions or an adverse 
 
 20. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 21. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
 22. Id. at 211. 
 23. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 24. Id. at 544 n.29. 
 25. Id.; see also United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(“Societe Internationale did not erect an absolute bar to summons enforcement and contempt 
sanctions whenever compliance is prohibited by foreign law.”). 
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inference—are either unavailable or ineffective, and that the due process 
interests of a debtor are significantly reduced when a judgment or arbitral 
award is rendered. 
The split in the Court’s NML opinions shone a bright light on the 
complete absence of authority on the second source of conflict with 
American transnational discovery—restrictions on execution.  There are 
four potential rules for conflicts between extraterritorial discovery and 
exemptions from execution.  The NML majority assumed that 
extraterritorial asset discovery is typically permissible.  Justice Ginsburg 
argued that discovery should be blocked where U.S. law would bar 
execution—essentially exporting U.S. law on immunity from execution to 
other nations.  A third approach is that U.S. courts could refuse asset 
discovery when the foreign nation where the asset sits would bar execution.  
Finally, U.S. courts could refuse discovery where essentially no country 
would permit execution, attempting to divine a customary international law 
norm barring, for example, seizure of consular property.  This final rule best 
serves the purposes of judgment enforcement and reflects the transnational 
nature of judgments and post-judgment asset discovery. 
Part I of this Article explores in depth the fundamental differences 
between merits and enforcement discovery.  Part II applies these insights to 
developing conflict rules to govern when extraterritorial assets discovery 
should be granted or refused when faced with foreign restrictions on 
discovery.  Part III tackles the same question with regard to foreign and 
domestic restrictions of execution of assets. 
I.   A DIFFERENT DISCOVERY 
In 1936, Robert P. Patterson, who would later turn down a seat on the 
Supreme Court to become Secretary of War,26 considered five post-
judgment subpoenas served on third-party stockbrokers in an attempt to 
recover a judgment of nearly $300,000.27  Judge Patterson stated:  “To be 
sure, the subpoenas are a fishing excursion, but a judgment creditor is 
entitled to fish for assets of the judgment debtor.  Otherwise he will rarely 
obtain satisfaction of his judgment from a reluctant judgment debtor.”28 
This statement captures the essence of the difference between pretrial and 
post-judgment discovery.  American pretrial discovery is certainly broad.29  
Commentators and scholars have often noted its breadth in comparison to 
 
 26. J. Garry Clifford, Introduction to ROBERT PORTER PATTERSON, THE WORLD WAR I 
MEMOIRS OF ROBERT P. PATTERSON:  A CAPTAIN IN THE GREAT WAR xiii, xiv–xv (J. Garry 
Clifford ed., 2012). 
 27. Capital Co. v. Fox, 15 F. Supp. 677, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). 
 28. Id. (Lathrop v. Clapp. 40 N.Y. 328 (1869)). 
 29. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947); see also Gordon W. Netzorg 
& Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery:  Making It the Norm, Rather Than the Exception, 
87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 532 (2010). 
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the more limited document production permitted in most civil law 
countries.30  But pretrial discovery is still no “fishing excursion.” 
Post-judgment or post-award discovery—“enforcement discovery”—by 
necessity partakes of different values than pretrial discovery.  When a 
judgment or award is rendered, the ground shifts decisively between the 
parties.  In a merits proceeding, the purpose of pretrial discovery is to 
obtain information to determine the truth or falsity of certain claims, 
without permitting discovery when the burdens of production are out of 
proportion to the likelihood of producing probative evidence.  The court 
must guard carefully against discovery requests calculated to impose 
expense or to force settlement, rather than to produce useful information.  It 
is a delicate task. 
Post-judgment, the court’s job is to turn the paper judgment into actual 
relief—into cash.31  For noncompliant debtors, this is done by locating 
assets, seizing them, selling them, and applying that amount to the 
outstanding judgment.  In the view of some courts, the court shifts from 
impartial adjudicator to ally in the quest to vindicate both the creditor’s 
interests and the court’s outstanding judgment.32 
In NML, the Supreme Court waded hip-deep into these muddy waters.  
The ongoing saga of the Argentine sovereign debt litigation constitutes one 
of the most influential transnational disputes of the decade.  In the throes of 
one financial crisis, Argentina issued large amounts of sovereign debt.  In 
the throes of the next financial crisis, Argentina found itself unable to 
satisfy these obligations.  Argentina approached the purchasers of its 
sovereign debt and asked them to accept so-called exchange bonds as a 
trade-in for the original sovereign bonds—essentially, to accept a 
substantial haircut off the value of the original bonds.33  A few U.S.-based 
hedge funds, led by Paul Singer’s Elliott Management Corporation, had 
purchased the Argentine debt at a discount on the secondary market.  They 
refused to take a haircut and made clear their intention to seek the full value 
of the sovereign bonds.34 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Argentina had found it somewhat difficult to 
issue debt at attractive rates.  To give prospective lenders some comfort, the 
bonds were governed by New York law, enforceable in New York courts, 
 
 30. See Donncadh Woods, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Rules—Modernization of 
the EU Rules and the Road Ahead, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 431, 443 (2004); see also 
Keith Y. Cohan, Note, The Need for a Refined Balancing Approach When American 
Discovery Orders Demand the Violation of Foreign Law, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1009, 1044 
(2009). 
 31. For a money judgment, at least.  For other forms of relief, a judgment places the 
court in a managerial role over the obligations of the defendant. See Samuel L. Bray, The 
Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1127–28 (2014) (“[T]he 
availability of contempt sanctions means that the court has committed itself to manage the 
parties’ compliance with the decree and has put its own prestige on the line to back up this 
commitment.”). 
 32. See infra notes 82–94 and accompanying text. 
 33. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 34. See id. at 253. 
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and contained broad waivers of sovereign immunity.35  The funds—labeled 
“holdout funds” or “vulture funds,” depending on whom you ask36—sued in 
the Southern District of New York.  The court held that Argentina owed the 
funds the full amount of the bonds.37  That was the easy part. 
Argentina countered that, although it might owe the funds the full 
amount of the original bonds, it was entitled to pay its other creditors—
specifically, the more compliant creditors that had accepted the exchange 
bonds—ahead of the holdout funds.38  The funds responded that the “pari 
passu” clause in the bonds prevented this by requiring that all holders of the 
bonds be paid “at least equally.”39  The funds followed up with two 
additional requests for the New York court:  first, that it issue an injunction 
barring Argentina from paying the exchange bond holders ahead of them 
and barring various banks from processing any such payments, and second, 
that it compel Argentina and various third parties to reveal the nature of 
Argentina’s financial transactions around the world.40 
The district court ruled against Argentina on the pari passu issue and 
issued both the injunction and orders compelling worldwide discovery of 
Argentina’s assets.41  The Second Circuit affirmed each decision.42  At oral 
argument on the injunctive issue, Argentina’s counsel averred that his client 
would not comply with the court’s order, regardless of how the Second 
Circuit ruled.43  After its defeat before the appellate court, Argentina 
disavowed this position in seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court.44  It 
 
 35. See id. at 253–54. 
 36. See, e.g., John Muse-Fisher, Starving the Vultures:  NML Capital v. Republic of 
Argentina and Solutions to the Problem of Distressed-Debt Funds, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 
1685 (2014). 
 37. See NML, 699 F.3d at 254. 
 38. See id. at 252. 
 39. See id. at 258–59 (“[W]e conclude that in pairing the two sentences of its Pari Passu 
Clause, the FAA manifested an intention to protect bondholders from more than just formal 
subordination.”). 
 40. See, e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 680 F.3d 254, 256 & n.4 (2d 
Cir. 2012); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 
175–76 (2d Cir. 2011); Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 
120, 124–27 (2d Cir. 2009); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 & n.2 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
 41. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 03 Civ. 2507 (TPG), 2011 WL 
3897828, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011), aff’d sub nom. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 
695 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 
134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014) (granting discovery); see also NML, 699 F.3d at 250–51 (affirming 
district court orders holding that Argentina had violated the pari passu clause and issuing the 
injunctions). 
 42. See supra note 41. 
 43. Response of Appellees to the Republic of Argentina’s March 29 Proposal at 3, NML, 
699 F.3d 246, 2013 WL 1790907 (“At the most recent hearing before this Court, Argentina’s 
counsel declared that Argentina would not ‘voluntarily obey’ any order ‘other than’ the one 
it ‘proposed.’” (citation omitted)). 
 44. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 12–13, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 
134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-990), 2014 WL 2201061 (“To be clear, absent relief 
Argentina will comply with the orders under review.”); see also Alison Frankel, In New 
SCOTUS Brief, Argentina Pledges to Comply with U.S. Courts, REUTERS (May 30, 2014), 
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did no good.  The Court denied certiorari on both the pari passu issue and 
the injunctive issue.45 
The only issue that the Court took up was whether worldwide discovery 
of Argentina’s assets was appropriate.  The issue was framed not, however, 
as whether worldwide discovery was permissible, but rather as whether the 
FSIA barred discovery of Argentina’s assets.  The FSIA contains well-
known jurisdictional immunities for foreign sovereigns and foreign 
sovereign instrumentalities.46  These were explicitly waived in the terms of 
the Argentine bonds themselves.47  However, the FSIA also confers 
immunities from execution for the assets of foreign sovereigns and foreign 
sovereign instrumentalities.  These provisions provide that the property of a 
sovereign is only subject to execution if it is located in the United States 
and if the property itself is used for commercial purposes (the commercial 
use exception is somewhat broader for sovereign instrumentalities).48 
Argentina raised several distinct but related arguments.  First, it argued 
that the FSIA’s exemptions from execution necessarily imply restrictions on 
discovery.  From this premise, Argentina argued two conclusions:  first, that 
the funds must present evidence that its assets would be subject to seizure 
under the FSIA before receiving any discovery, and second, that the FSIA’s 
immunity from execution shielded even non-sovereign third parties holding 
Argentine assets (predominantly banks) from asset discovery.49 
The funds’ response was three-fold.  First, the funds argued that the FSIA 
says nothing about discovery and, indeed, the legislative history 
demonstrates that this was a conscious and considered omission.  Second, 
the funds contended that, even if the FSIA had something to say about 
discovery, any such protections would not extend to third parties holding 
sovereign assets.  Third, the funds objected to the notion that creditors 
would be able to present evidence that sovereign assets could be seized 
under the FSIA without receiving any discovery.  Such a rule, they argued, 
would effectively immunize sovereign assets from execution as creditors 
could discover only those assets that the sovereign chose to make available 
(presumably, none).  The overarching theme of their argument was that the 
FSIA is a “comprehensive” scheme that should not be supplemented by 
U.S. courts. 
At argument, the Justices, Justice Ginsburg excepted, heaped scorn on 
the notion that the FSIA, sub silentio, imposed restrictions on discovery.50  
Justice Ginsburg appeared to be the only member of the Court sympathetic 
 
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/05/30/in-new-scotus-brief-argentina-pledges-to-
comply-with-u-s-courts/. 
 45. The Court denied certiorari in the injunction matter and on the pari passu issue on 
the same day it announced its decision in the discovery case. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2013). 
 46. See infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 47. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 (2014). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Brief for Petitioner at 28, NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), 2014 WL 
768310. 
 50. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, NML, 134 S. Ct. 2250. 
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to Argentina’s argument that the restrictions on execution necessarily 
implied restrictions on discovery.  All seemed well for the funds until Ted 
Olson, counsel for the creditors, approached the podium.  The Court, 
seemingly as a whole, expressed grave concern that untrammeled discovery 
could reach into areas of intense sovereign sensitivity—such as, for 
example, jet fighters.51  Mr. Olson responded that the discovery requests at 
issue concerned only financial transactions, but this seemed to make no 
impression on the Court.  Several members of the Court expressed the 
belief that the United States would strongly object to such discovery of its 
assets (indeed, the United States had already said as much in its amicus 
briefs supporting Argentina at the certiorari and merits stage).52  Skepticism 
seemed to come from all angles.  In one colloquy, Justice Scalia queried 
whether a New York judgment would carry with it exemptions from 
execution imposed by New York law, hypothesizing a fictional New York 
Homestead Act.53  (Justice Sotomayor responded, correctly, that it would 
not.54) 
The Court’s opinion seemed to bear no marks of this late-breaking 
skepticism.  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, concluded that the FSIA 
says nothing about discovery—and therefore, says nothing about discovery.  
He essentially adopted the funds’ argument regarding timing:  if the 
creditors did not know what assets were out there, they could hardly be 
expected to plead that Argentina’s assets were amenable to execution under 
the FSIA.55  The Court did not engage with the appropriateness of 
transnational enforcement discovery generally.  It simply assumed, without 
deciding, that such discovery was appropriate in this case. 
Justice Ginsburg authored a highly economical but pointed dissent.  She 
abandoned her tack at oral argument that the execution immunities in the 
FSIA necessarily included restrictions on discovery, but launched a subtler 
attack on the majority’s reasoning.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 
refers judgment creditors to state procedures for discovery56 and execution 
and, acting in concert with them, imposes the restriction that asset discovery 
be “relevant” to satisfaction of the judgment.57  Justice Ginsburg queried:  
How can discovery of assets not available for seizure be relevant to 
satisfaction of the judgment?  She echoed the widely held belief that 
American discovery is broad to the point of offending other sovereigns and 
suggested, presumptively at least, that a U.S. court should look to U.S. law 
for its assumptions as to what is or is not open for seizure and therefore 
relevant for purposes of discovery.58 
 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 34. 
 52. Id. at 52. 
 53. See id. at 42–44. 
 54. See id. at 48. 
 55. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2256–57. 
 56. Rule 69 also permits creditors to seek discovery under federal law. See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 69(a)(2). 
 57. See id. 26(b)(1); infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 58. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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A.   Merits Vs. Enforcement Discovery 
The Court seems to have settled the application of the FSIA to 
transnational asset discovery.  But the Court did nothing to shed light on 
whether and when transnational enforcement discovery, as a general matter, 
is available.  Indeed, the split between the majority and Justice Ginsburg 
highlighted the absence of guiding authority on transnational discovery in 
aid of enforcement. 
The overriding reason for this absence of authority, and the resulting 
confusion on display in the clashing NML opinions, is that courts have 
consistently failed to appreciate the differences between merits discovery 
and enforcement discovery.  In fact, the two mechanisms are similar only in 
that they both lead to the production of information.  Beyond that, they have 
different purposes, different standards, different presumptions, different 
means to deter bad faith conduct, and differing sovereign interests.  These 
differences must be analyzed in order to formulate workable approaches to 
transnational enforcement discovery. 
1.   Purposes 
Pretrial merits discovery serves a multitude of purposes:  “to avoid 
surprise and the possible miscarriage of justice, to disclose fully the nature 
and scope of the controversy, to narrow, simplify, and frame the issues 
involved, and to enable a party to obtain the information needed to prepare 
for trial.”59  The revisions that liberalized discovery under the Federal Rules 
flowed from the “utopian” principle that “better mutual knowledge would 
enable the two sides to agree on the facts and issues, settle more cases, and 
reduce the number of issues and length of trials.”60 
This is the central irony of pretrial discovery under the Federal Rules 
(widely followed by the states)61:  It was made broader to better narrow the 
civil justice process further down the road, at trial or in settlement 
negotiations.62  To put it mildly, the ability of liberal pretrial discovery to 
achieve these purposes has come under heavy criticism.  The Supreme 
Court observed:  “It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery . . . has 
a significant potential for abuse.  This abuse is not limited to matters of 
delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests 
of litigants and third parties.”63  This experience (particularly with the 
 
 59. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2001 (3d ed. 2014) (Purposes and Problems of Discovery). 
 60. WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 234 
(1968). 
 61. John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts:  A Survey of 
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986). 
 62. Jeffrey W. Stempel & David F. Herr, Applying Amended Rule 26(B)(1) in Litigation:  
The New Scope of Discovery, 199 F.R.D. 396, 406 (2001) (“[P]ermitting reasonable 
discovery under a claim or defense standard would appear to meet the original rulemakers’ 
hope that discovery would encourage not only accurate adjudication but also settlement or 
the dropping of weak claims.”). 
 63. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34–35 (1984). 
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massive costs of e-discovery) has led to a long running “containment” 
movement in pretrial discovery.64  Courts and commentators have made 
clear that pretrial discovery is “not designed to permit a plaintiff to make 
broad-based allegations without any basis for a belief in those allegations 
and then to invade the defendant’s records in an attempt to determine 
whether or not a cause of action exists.”65  These concerns motivated, in 
part, the Court’s decisions to tighten pleading standards such that 
unsupported allegations could be quickly culled at the motion to dismiss 
stage.66 
Post-judgment asset discovery, however, serves not the purposes of 
adjudication but the very different purposes of judgment enforcement.  Von 
Mehren and Trautman touched on these purposes in their seminal work on 
recognition of foreign judgments.67  They identified the purposes, among 
others, of promoting satisfaction of judgments, frustrating the attempts of 
scofflaw debtors, and ensuring that the mere location of the defendant’s 
assets does not become the determinative factor in choosing a forum to 
adjudicate the dispute.68 
These different purposes manifest themselves in the details of 
enforcement discovery in numerous ways.  For example, creditors are 
entitled to begin asset discovery with phenomenally broad (by the standards 
of pretrial discovery) requests that are essentially aimed at uncovering “all 
matter relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment,”69 including “any and 
all” assets in which the debtors have an interest, whether in the debtor’s 
hands or in that of a third party (often referred to as a garnishee).70  These 
requests can be directed to the debtor, a garnishee, or any other party that 
could have any information that could lead to the debtor’s assets. 
There are numerous reasons for this breadth.  In pretrial discovery, the 
plaintiff is presumed to have some knowledge of the defendant’s alleged 
misdeeds.  Indeed, the plaintiff must have such information to satisfy the 
standards of notice pleading and to survive a motion to dismiss.71  A newly 
minted judgment or award creditor frequently has no information 
whatsoever about the debtor’s assets—or in the words of Justice Scalia’s 
NML opinion:  “[T]he reason for these subpoenas is that NML does not yet 
know what property Argentina has and where it is, let alone whether it is 
executable under the relevant jurisdiction’s law.”72 
In addition to breadth, post-judgment discovery must be fast.  In a 
manual issued by the Department of Justice, the government observes that 
 
 64. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
747 (1998). 
 65. 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 59, § 2001. 
 66. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 67. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 12. 
 68. See id. at 1603–04. 
 69. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5223 (McKinney 2015). 
 70. Young v. Torelli, 522 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (App. Div. 1987). 
 71. See Dennis J. Connolly, Twombly/Iqbal Pleading Requirements in Preference and 
Fraudulent-Transfer Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2010, at 22. 
 72. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014). 
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assets not seized in the first nine months are likely never to be seized at 
all.73  Certainly, pretrial discovery is not designed to move slowly.  
Recollections fade, documents are lost or are deleted, witnesses move away 
or die.74  But the defendant is not presumed to be hiding or secreting 
evidence such that the adjudicative function of the court will be frustrated.  
If they do, spoliation penalties loom.  Not so post-judgment.75 
Von Mehren and Trautman also observed that a functioning judgment 
enforcement system should frustrate the tactics of scofflaw debtors.  This 
has some overlap, of course, with their statement that a judgment 
enforcement system should be fast and efficient.  Nevertheless, it has 
additional implications for post-judgment discovery.  For example, scofflaw 
debtors frequently attempt to transfer their assets to nominal third parties, to 
trusts that will shield the assets from enforcements, or to creditors that they 
would rather pay ahead of their current antagonist.76  Enforcement activities 
are frequently directed at uncovering and clawing back these “fraudulent 
conveyances.”77  This requires discovery not only of assets currently owned 
by the debtor, or information reasonably calculated to lead to assets 
currently owned by the debtor, but also of information on any assets that 
may have been owned by the debtor during the pendency of the dispute or 
the debt. 
In NML, the Court encountered the last and perhaps least obvious of the 
von Mehren and Trautman purposes of judgment enforcement:  that the 
forum where the debtor’s assets are located not perforce become the forum 
of adjudication.78  This purpose directly informs the availability of 
transnational enforcement discovery. 
Von Mehren and Trautman’s framework acknowledges that creditors 
often must go beyond the forum of adjudication to obtain satisfaction of a 
judgment.  This typically cannot happen without the assistance of various 
courts—the courts of other sovereigns, who recognize and enforce the 
judgment and, as important, the judgment-rendering court, which, by 
compelling broad enforcement discovery, assists the judgment creditor in 
finding which sovereigns have territorial power over the debtor’s assets. 
Perhaps it was once true that this process of locating a debtor’s assets 
could occur without discovery.  Some assets—buildings, equipment, oil 
tankers, private planes—are easier to locate than others—brokerage 
 
 73. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUDGMENT COLLECTION MANUAL, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/JCM2004/04jcmtax.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 
2015). 
 74. See, e.g., Estrada v. Burnham, 341 S.E.2d 538, 544 (N.C. 1986) (“With the passage 
of time, memories fade or fail altogether, witnesses die or move away, evidence is lost or 
destroyed . . . .”). 
 75. See infra Part I.A.4. 
 76. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law 
and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985). 
 77. Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REV. 495, 495 (1983) 
(“Since the enactment of the Statute of Elizabeth in the sixteenth century, fraudulent 
conveyance law has protected creditors by invalidating certain transactions that render 
debtors’ assets unreachable.”). 
 78. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 12, at 1603–04. 
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accounts, wire transfers, LLC interests.  It is certainly true, however, that 
these other assets, intangible property that in practice cannot be located 
without discovery, have become dominant.79 
Von Mehren and Trautman’s third purpose of judgment enforcement 
highlights the essential cleavage in transnational asset discovery.  Some 
courts have viewed post-judgment discovery as a floodlight, designed to 
illuminate the debtor’s assets anywhere in the world, such that the creditor 
can seek them out, domesticate its U.S. judgment in those jurisdictions, and 
seize those assets.  Other courts have viewed post-judgment discovery as 
narrow and focused—a spotlight designed to reveal those assets seizable in 
the rendering court’s territorial jurisdiction.  This split represents not just a 
divide on the appropriate use of post-judgment asset discovery but a 
disagreement on the fundamental nature of judgments.  Some courts have 
embraced a world in which a judgment rendered in a significant commercial 
or tort suit almost certainly will be used (or could be used) transnationally.  
Others have continued to conceive of judgments as fundamentally local:  
what other sovereigns do with a U.S. judgment is their business. 
In U.S. federal court, post-judgment discovery is governed by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 69, which states that “[i]n aid of the judgment or 
execution, the judgment creditor . . . may obtain discovery from any 
person—including the judgment debtor—as provided in these rules or by 
the procedure of the state where the court is located.”80  State law typically 
provides that creditors may obtain discovery of “all matter relevant to the 
satisfaction of [a] judgment.”81 
When considering requests for transnational enforcement discovery, 
many federal courts have interpreted these provisions to provide that “[a] 
judgment creditor is entitled to discover the identity and location of any of 
the judgment debtor’s assets, wherever located.”82  These courts certainly 
allow that discovery “should be reasonably calculated to lead to assets that 
can be levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution,”83 but reject the notion 
that “discovery is limited to material likely to lead to discovery of assets 
 
 79. See Aaron D. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
(forthcoming 2015); see also CAROL CORRADO, CHARLES HULTEN & DANIEL SICHEL, FED. 
RESERVE BD., INTANGIBLE CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2006), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/FEDS/2006/200624/200624pap.pdf (concluding that a 
majority of all U.S. corporate assets are intangible). 
 80. FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2).  The relevant provision for merits discovery under the 
Federal Rules is Rule 26(b)(1), which in turn provides:  “Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Id. 
26(b)(1).  Rule 69(a) discovery is subject to the same limitations as that of Rule 26, which 
provides that a party may obtain information “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence.” Id. 
 81. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5223 (McKinney 2014). 
 82. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Vafla Corp., 694 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir. 1982); see also 
Credit Lyonnais, S.A. v. SGC Int’l, Inc., 160 F.3d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
federal law “allows judgment creditors to conduct full post-judgment discovery to aid in 
executing judgment”). 
 83. Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, No. 81 Civ. 7619 (MEL), 1989 WL 57704, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 24, 1989). 
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subject to [the rendering court’s] writ.”84  These courts have rejected the 
local or territorial view on a variety of grounds.  They have reasoned that 
Rule 69 embodies an intent “to provide the post-judgment creditor with an 
efficient means of uncovering the existence of assets upon which he may 
levy to satisfy the judgment.”85 
These courts also have expressed a belief that it is appropriate for the 
judgment-rendering court to take an active role in guiding the creditor’s 
search for assets around the globe.  The rendering court should not require 
“judgment creditors to serve interrogatories upon [judgment debtors], from 
each jurisdiction, that asked only about assets in that jurisdiction.”86  
Moreover, “[t]here is no reason why, simply because the judgment must be 
registered in each district in which execution is sought, discovery as to 
assets must occur in each jurisdiction.”87  These courts also have noted that 
Rule 69 has been given a broad construction in numerous other contexts, for 
example in permitting discovery from third parties, even if they are not 
charged with holding executable assets.88  In a seminal decision, the 
Eleventh Circuit rejected the notion “that a party is entitled to seek 
discovery of information only with respect to the state in which the action is 
pending.”89  The court stated simply:  “A judgment creditor is entitled to 
discover the identity and location of any of the judgment debtor’s assets, 
wherever located.”90 
State courts mostly have taken a similar approach.  New York courts, for 
example, have strongly endorsed generous enforcement discovery.  One 
court noted that “public policy mandates that no obstacle be put in the path 
of a judgment creditor seeking to enforce the judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction.”91  It held that the creditor could pursue discovery 
of “funds outside the jurisdiction” which would then “be subject to 
[attachment under] the laws of the situs jurisdiction.”92  Another New York 
trial court held Bank of America in contempt for failing to respond to 
extraterritorial asset discovery, noting that “[t]he dispute involves New 
York residents,” that “the New York Court had jurisdiction over the parties 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Dering v. Pitassi, No. 88-2278, 1988 WL 115806, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 1988) 
(emphasis added); see also SEC v. Guieseppe, No. 81-1836, 1987 WL 9415, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 3, 1987) (noting that intent of Rule 69 is to provide “an effective and efficient means of 
securing the execution of judgments”). 
 86. Minpeco, 1989 WL 57704, at *2. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id.; Caisson Corp. v. Cnty. W. Bldg. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331, 334–35 (E.D. Pa. 
1974) (granting order requiring the sole stockholder of debtor corporation to answer 
questions concerning entities with which the debtor has or had a relationship); Monticello 
Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 12 F.R.D. 344, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (granting order 
compelling the attorney for plaintiff to answer questions concerning payment in aid of 
execution of a judgment entered for defendants). 
 89. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Vafla Corp., 694 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 90. Id.; see also First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Fisher, 422 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ga. 
1976). 
 91. Raji v. Bank Sepah-Iran, 529 N.Y.S.2d 420, 423–24 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (citing Siemens 
& Halske v. Gres, 354 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973)). 
 92. Id.; see also Gavilanes v. Matavosian, 475 N.Y.S.2d 987, 988 (Civ. Ct. 1984). 
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initially,” that “[t]he judgment was rendered in New York and New York 
has continuing jurisdiction to enforce its subpoenas in supplementary 
proceedings,” and that “[t]he court can find no legal nor practical reason 
why the bank should not respond.”93  The court added that “Plaintiff still 
has a long road to hoe to reach judgment debtors[’] funds but the Bank’s 
refusal to answer [the discovery request] is not justified.”94 
New York courts did not exactly have legislative encouragement in 
crafting a robust approach to transnational enforcement discovery.  New 
York Judiciary Law section 2-b “bars the service of a New York subpoena 
outside the state no matter how much justification there may be for it.”95  
But New York courts, “[r]ealizing that it’s unfair, if not absurd, to impede 
the collection of a duly rendered New York judgment by the imposition of 
an artificial restriction such as that imposed by [Judiciary Law] § 2-b,” have 
“often found ways around it.”96  Following the courts’ lead, the New York 
legislature passed C.P.L.R. 5224(a-1), “an amendment enacted in 2006, 
establish[ing] the extraterritorial reach of a subpoena duces tecum, 
subjecting a corporation to ‘the full disclosure prescribed by [CPLR 5223] 
whether the materials sought are in the possession, custody or control of the 
[corporation] within or without the state.’”97 
U.S. federal courts have taken a similarly enthusiastic approach to post-
arbitral award discovery.  For example, Judge Alvin Hellerstein of the 
Southern District of New York considered one award creditor’s efforts—in 
his words, “yet another episode in the saga of petitioner and judgment 
creditor[’s] . . . efforts to collect on its judgment”—to collect on an English 
arbitral award issued two years earlier.98  The award creditor had obtained 
recognition of the award in New York and issued discovery requests on 
several garnishee banks, including for information from Bank of India’s 
Mumbai branch office.  The Bank of India “limit[ed] its responses to 
materials available from within its New York branch,” but by doing so, 
“misconstrued the scope of its obligations under New York law.”99  The 
court stated that “[t]here is no question that [the creditor] served its 
subpoenas on Bank of India in state, by service upon Bank of India’s New 
York branch,” nor “is there any question that [the creditor] seeks the 
 
 93. Gavilanes, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 991. 
 94. Id.  The court asked, perhaps channeling the creditor’s frustration:  “How onerous 
can it be to comply with the request, when the account number of the judgment debtor is 
provided on the subpoena?” Id. 
 95. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5224 cmt. C5224:5 (McKinney 2014) (author Richard C. Reilly, 
recompiling David D. Siegel’s commentary); see also DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK 
PRACTICE § 383 (4th ed. 2005). 
 96. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5224 cmt. C5224:5 (author Richard C. Reilly, recompiling David D. 
Siegel’s commentary); see also Coutts Bank (Switz.) Ltd. v. Anatian, 713 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47–
48 (App. Div. 2000); Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Waterfront Comm., 371 N.E.2d 453, 455 
(N.Y. 1977). 
 97. CE Int’l Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P’ship, No. 12-CV-
08087(CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
5224(a-1)). 
 98. Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of India, 827 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 99. Id. at 237–38. 
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production of materials in Bank of India’s possession, custody, or 
control.”100  Therefore, the “Bank of India must produce the materials [the 
creditor] seeks, even if those materials are located outside New York.”101 
Granted, arbitral awards are more clearly transnational creatures.  
Enforcement of arbitral awards is governed by the New York Convention, a 
treaty signed by over 150 countries.102  There are vigorous debates about 
the transnational character of arbitral awards—such as the effects of a set 
aside at the seat of the arbitration on the enforcement of the award103—but 
many arbitrators and arbitral institutions have adopted the position that they 
have an affirmative obligation to ensure enforceability of the award,104 
including some consideration of where assets are located.105  Similarly, 
many commentators have pushed courts to take a more active role in 
ensuring enforceability of awards, including vigorous use of interim 
measures.106 
But this distinction may be less than it seems.  American states have 
adopted a remarkably open approach to enforcement of foreign 
judgments—a decision not without cost.107  This openness comes not from 
magnanimity but from the hope and desire that U.S. judgments will be well 
received abroad.108  In light of this policy, it would be strange indeed for 
U.S. courts to treat U.S. judgments and judgment enforcement discovery as 
if they were purely local in scope. 
2.   Relevance 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 states that “[p]arties may obtain 
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 
 
 100. Id. at 238. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Two New State Parties to the New York Convention, 1958 N.Y. CONVENTION GUIDE, 
http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=cmspage&pageid=7&id_news=467 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
 103. See, e.g., Filip De Ly, Forum Shopping and the Determination of the Place of 
Arbitration, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
CONTEXT 53 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2013) [hereinafter FORUM SHOPPING]; Loukas Mistelis, 
Setting Aside of Arbitral Awards and Forum Shopping in International Arbitration:  
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SHOPPING, supra, at 277; Linda Silberman & Maxi Scherer, Forum-Shopping and Post-
Award Judgments, in FORUM SHOPPING, supra, at 313. 
 104. See Martin Platte, An Arbitrator’s Duty to Render Enforceable Award, 20 J. INT’L 
ARB. 307, 307 (2003). But see Christopher Boog & Benjamin Moss, The Lazy Myth of the 
Arbitral Tribunal’s Duty to Render an Enforceable Award, KLUEWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 28, 
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 105. See Platte, supra note 104, at 312–13. 
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 107. See Christopher A. Whytock, Some Cautionary Notes on the “Chevronization” of 
Transnational Litigation, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 467, 468 (2013). 
 108. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 175–76 (2008); see also Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:  Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 
31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 205–06 (2013). 
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claim or defense.”109  In addition, “[f]or good cause, the court may order 
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
action.”110  The concept of relevance is the key check on unbridled, 
overbroad pretrial discovery. 
Jeffrey Stempel and David Herr, writing on the 2000 amendments to 
Rule 26 intended to narrow the scope of available pretrial discovery, 
observed that, for the first standard, “[a]n item of information sought is 
relevant to a claim or defense if the requesting party can articulate a logical 
relationship between the information sought and possible proof or refutation 
of the claim or defense at trial.”111  On the good cause standard, Stempel 
and Herr wrote that a party requesting discovery not logically related to a 
current claim or defense should show the information’s importance to the 
case, the likelihood of obtaining the information, and that the probity of the 
information will outweigh “the purported discovery vices of increased cost, 
delay, or harassment.”112  Even “[i]f the requesting party makes this 
showing, the opponent may still be able to avoid this discovery if it can 
demonstrate that the burden of the subject-matter discovery outweighs its 
benefit.”113 
Enforcement discovery must be “relevant” to execution—but this 
connection is necessarily loose.  The information sought need not lead to 
assets subject to the power of the court issuing discovery.  The information 
could well be for the purpose of guiding the creditor to other jurisdictions 
where it would domesticate its judgment and use the execution processes of 
those courts. 
Judge Clifford Scott Green observed that “the limits of the concept of 
relevancy in connection with discovery in aid of execution of judgment, as 
here, must be somewhat different,” because “of the fact that there is no 
longer an action pending which may be utilized by reference to its subject 
matter to assist in definition of the scope of discoverable matter.”114  Judge 
Green set broad limits on discovery from third-party garnishees, stating that 
discovery must be relevant to finding assets of the judgment debtor and 
cannot be used for harassment or to discover assets of the third party itself 
and that, “[m]ore significantly, it is clear that in an attempt to discover 
 
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Stempel & Herr, supra note 62, at 408–09. 
 112. Id. at 421.  Stempel and Herr identify the following factors: 
[T]he reason the information is important to the case; the reason that the 
information is at least potentially likely to emerge from the discovery requested; 
and why permitting the discovery will be more consistent with full factual 
development and accurate adjudication rather than furthering the purported 
discovery vices of increased cost, delay, or harassment of others.  If the requesting 
party makes this showing, the opponent may still be able to avoid this discovery if 
it can demonstrate that the burden of the subject-matter discovery outweighs its 
benefit. 
Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Caisson Corp. v. Cnty. W. Bldg. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
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assets by which to satisfy its judgment, plaintiff is entitled to a very 
thorough examination of the judgment debtor.”115 
Courts taking this approach have noted that discovery proceedings and 
execution proceedings are separate.116  Indeed, Rule 69 separates them into 
two provisions.117  This approach also necessarily implies that a judgment-
rendering or enforcing court views a judgment as transnational.  A U.S. 
court rendering or enforcing a judgment accepts that the creditor is likely to 
take that judgment abroad to further its search for assets. 
The related, and perhaps, necessary conclusion that follows from this 
premise is that creditors enjoy a strong presumption in favor of 
transnational enforcement discovery.  Creditors clearly enjoy the ability to 
obtain information from the debtor or from third parties that could, even in 
attenuated fashion, lead to the debtor’s assets.  This includes shining a light 
on the debtor’s assets around the world and, if third-party garnishees are 
subject to the court’s adjudicative jurisdiction, any assets held by third-
party garnishees anywhere in the world. 
David Siegel, the dean of New York state civil procedure scholars, 
considered what is “matter relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment” and 
noted that “[t]his is a generous standard and permits the creditor a broad 
range of inquiry through either the judgment debtor or any third person with 
light to shed on the debtor’s property, present or potential” and that any 
“attempt to delineate the inquiries that can be made or the materials that can 
be elicited would be futile.”118 
Some federal courts, however, have taken an approach akin to pretrial 
discovery, requiring some threshold showing of relevance before 
compelling discovery against third-party garnishees.  For example, one 
federal district court—essentially adopting the timing argument later 
advanced by Argentina before the Supreme Court—stated that, at the 
outset, “a judgment creditor must make a threshold showing of necessity 
and relevance when attempting to obtain discovery of a non-judgment 
debtor pursuant to Rule 69(a).”119  Without this showing, the court reasoned 
that it could not answer the “crucial question” of whether the financial 
records sought would lead to satisfaction of the judgment.120  In this 
instance, the creditor was attempting to identify and claw back fraudulent 
transfers.  However, the court held the creditor’s “desire to void [the 
allegedly fraudulent] transactions is too far removed from a present ‘aid of 
the judgment or execution’ as contemplated by Rule 69(a).”121 
A New York court recently took a similarly narrow approach.  The 
judgment had traveled a somewhat circuitous route to New York.  The 
 
 115. Id. at 335. 
 116. See, e.g., Mid-Dakota Clinic, P.C. v. Kolsrud, 603 N.W.2d 475, 476 (N.D. 1999). 
 117. See FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a). 
 118. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5223 cmt. C5223:2 (McKinney 2014) (author Richard C. Reilly, 
recompiling David D. Siegel’s commentary) (“Relevancy is the central theme.”). 
 119. Blaw Knox Corp. v. AMR Indus., Inc., 130 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D. Wis. 1990). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 404. 
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creditor obtained a Lebanese judgment, obtained recognition of the foreign 
money judgment in Maryland, and then registered the judgment as a sister 
state judgment in New York.  The judgment creditor then attempted to 
obtain discovery from a foreign bank by serving its New York branch.122  
The discovery requests encompassed any assets of the debtor in any foreign 
branch of the bank.123  The bank refused to respond on the grounds of the 
separate entity rule and foreign secrecy laws that it alleged would subject 
the bank to civil and criminal penalties if it and its employees complied 
with the discovery requests.124 
The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel, first because the 
plaintiff could not prove that any of the judgment debtor’s activities had 
taken place in New York.  Second, the court stated that discovery was but 
the first step toward execution, and because assets were not located in the 
jurisdiction, discovery efforts would seem wasteful:  “For the Court to start 
down this path, knowing that the ultimate goal is unavailable in this 
jurisdiction, would be an unproductive waste of judicial resources.”125  The 
First Department, the state intermediate appellate court for Manhattan, 
upheld that decision, suggesting that the denial was appropriate because the 
“underlying dispute did not originate in the United States, the Hague 
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial 
Matters provides an alternative recourse, and ordering compliance raises the 
risk of undermining important interests of other nations by potentially 
conflicting with their privacy laws or regulations.”126 
3.   Due Process 
Due process gives defendants the right to be free from the power of 
sovereigns with whom they have no contacts.  Due process interests also 
give defendants the right to be free from needlessly burdensome 
discovery.127  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 embodies this value, 
among others, in giving courts the power to limit discovery where “the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, 
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”128 
The “burden” on a party engaged in pretrial discovery weighs far more 
heavily than the “burden” on a judgment debtor.  The calculus changes 
because the due process interests of a judgment debtor have either been 
 
 122. Ayyash v. Koleilat, 957 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
 123. Id. at 579–80. 
 124. Id. at 579. 
 125. Id. at 582. 
 126. Ayyash v. Koleilat, 981 N.Y.S.2d 536, 536 (App. Div. 2014) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 127. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Jordan M. Schwartz, Can E-
Discovery Violate Due Process?  Part 1, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS (June 7, 2013), available 
at http://www.skadden.com/insights/can-e-discovery-violate-due-process-part-1. 
 128. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c)(iii). 
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extinguished by the judgment129 or significantly reduced.130  The gulf 
between a defendant and a debtor is best illustrated by one profound 
difference—a defendant cannot be haled into court wherever it has 
property; a debtor can.131 
Courts have little solicitude for the “burden” of judgment or award 
debtors.  The due process interests of the debtor are reduced—accordingly 
the debtor has little ground to object to the necessarily broad and 
encompassing discovery request of asset discovery.  The debtor also holds 
the keys to its own salvation.  This need not consist simply of paying the 
judgment, although that is certainly an option.  The debtor typically can 
obtain a stay of discovery as of right by posting a supersedeas bond.132  The 
bond secures the creditor’s judgment and obviates the need for recourse to 
the debtor’s assets.  Accordingly, appeal of the judgment can proceed at its 
usual stately pace.  Judgment debtors are loath to do this.  If the object of 
the exercise is to avoid paying a judgment, posting collateral for a bond in 
the home of the enforcing court will necessarily be unattractive.  Of course, 
if the debtor’s sole object is to avoid paying a valid judgment, it should not 
be heard to complain of burdens. 
Debtors have had their due process interests diminished by the rendering 
of a judgment or an award against them—but not so with garnishees.  
Garnishees are mere third parties caught holding the debtor’s assets.  
Garnishees, like third-party witnesses, are presumed to have “no dog in 
th[e] fight.”133  Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized this principle in 
holding that, in some circumstances, a third-party witness may immediately 
appeal a discovery order because “the third party presumably lacks a 
sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing 
compliance.”134  The Federal Rules recognize this burden by requiring that 
courts balance the need for the information with the expense imposed135 
and by empowering courts to quash subpoenas that impose an undue burden 
on a third party.136   
The Court has never directly recognized that third-party witnesses enjoy 
any due process protection from assertions of jurisdiction, but most courts 
 
 129. See generally James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, Personal Jurisdiction and the New 
York Convention, INT’L LITIG., Summer 2012, at 2. 
 130. See Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Meets International Arbitration:  A Tribute 
to Hans Smit, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 439, 444 (2012) (arguing that, although the Shaffer 
distinction between pre- and post-judgment is relevant for both award and judgment 
enforcement actions, it is nevertheless “surprising and indefensible” to hold “that a foreign 
country judgment may be enforced in New York without the necessity of having jurisdiction 
over the judgment debtor or his property”). 
 131. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 n.14 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210–11 nn.36–37 (1976)). 
 132. See 11 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 59, § 2905 (Stay upon Appeal). 
 133. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998). See generally 
Ryan W. Scott, Minimum Contacts, No Dog:  Evaluating Personal Jurisdiction for Nonparty 
Discovery, 88 MINN. L. REV. 968 (2004). 
 134. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992). 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(3). 
 136. Id. 45(d)(3)(iv). 
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have assumed as much as each discovery request carries with it the 
possibility of a contempt judgment.137  Of course, a judgment on liability 
and a contempt judgment are very different creatures, but “it is unclear 
which way that should cut.”138  However, the Second Circuit held that a 
foreign company could be compelled to provide testimony in New York, 
even though jurisdiction was obtained only by service of process, because 
“a person who is subjected to liability by service of process far from home 
may have better cause to complain of an outrage to fair play than one 
similarly situated who is merely called upon to supply documents or 
testimony.”139  The Second Circuit also rejected the argument that a non-
party witness should “command solicitude simply because it is an entity 
foreign to New York and the United States.”140 
The related law of seizing assets from garnishees also sheds light on this 
question.  The burden of responding to broad discovery requests is not the 
only or even the most important burden.  Due process interests require that 
the court be aware of the hardship of criminal prosecution that could be 
leveled at a third-party garnishee after complying with American 
discovery.141  And yet, U.S. courts have little patience for noncompliant 
garnishees facing criminal prosecution as a result of seizure of assets.142  
Numerous courts have observed, in effect, that if a multinational entity 
cannot comply with the demands of U.S. law, perhaps it should relinquish 
the privileges of doing business in the United States.143  Courts have carved 
out a sort of exception for multinationals that could not reasonably 
anticipate being caught between the demands of U.S. law and the 
requirements of another sovereign.144  This exception has seldom been 
applied—and, at the least, it certainly does not apply to banks, the entity 
that most typically finds itself in the uncomfortable position of holding a 
debtor’s assets that one sovereign would seize and another would shield.145 
This rough treatment of third-party banks at the hands of U.S. courts may 
be surprising, but it reflects the conclusion that these multinational 
garnishees had adequate notice that they could be subjected to the 
irreconcilable demands of multiple sovereigns and, indeed, that these 
 
 137. See Scott, supra note 133, at 978. 
 138. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 
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multinationals have derived substantial benefit from operating across 
sovereign boundaries.  Moreover, third-party garnishees have typically 
derived benefits from holding the debtors’ assets—a bank deposit, 
brokerage account, or electronic funds transfer all being excellent examples. 
There would seem to be little reason to be more solicitous of third parties 
in discovery proceedings than in garnishment proceedings.  It therefore 
appears that the interests of debtors and their third-party garnishees must be 
viewed as altered in post-judgment proceedings.146 
4.   Sanctions for Misconduct 
Discovery requests in the United States are broad by design but are not 
without limits.  A party responding to merits discovery always has the 
opportunity to decide for itself whether a particular document is relevant or 
privileged.147  But there are tools in place to punish parties that exercise this 
power in bad faith, such as issuing an adverse inference, contempt penalties, 
or dismissal of claims.148 
These remedies are ineffectual in post-judgment practice.  In a merits 
proceeding, an adverse inference or dismissal of claims are powerful tools.  
In post-judgment practice, they are irrelevant.149  Similarly, a contempt 
sanction is normally something that parties in merits litigation strive to 
avoid.  In post-judgment practice, a contempt judgment means little to a 
scofflaw debtor with an already outstanding and unsatisfied judgment 
(although it still can be very persuasive to a garnishee).  For these reasons, 
the debtor does not and should not have the freedom to decide what is 
“relevant” to a post-judgment discovery request. 
Indeed, the clashing NML opinions highlight this difference, albeit 
without explicit acknowledgement.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rejects 
the argument that “if a judgment creditor could not ultimately execute a 
judgment against certain property, then it has no business pursuing 
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26(b)(1) Scope of Discovery:  An Empirical Analysis of Its Potential “Relevancy” to 
Employment Discrimination Actions, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1111 (2001). 
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discovery of information pertaining to that property,” noting that the very 
“reason for these subpoenas is that NML does not yet know what property 
Argentina has and where it is, let alone whether it is executable under the 
relevant jurisdiction’s law.”150  These statements embody an assumption 
that courts will decide what is and is not executable. 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent singles out this passage in particular for 
disagreement.  She states that “[w]ithout proof of any kind that other 
nations broadly expose a foreign sovereign’s property to arrest,” a creditor’s 
enforcement discovery should be limited to categories of assets made 
available for seizure by U.S. law.151  This approach allows the debtor to 
decide what assets are or are not available for execution.  In pretrial 
discovery, this is standard—the producing party has the power to decide for 
itself what is responsive to discovery requests.  If the producing party 
believes that responsive documents are shielded by privilege, it typically 
produces a privilege log, which allows an adversarial examination of 
privilege claims.152  But, naturally, these obligations become bound up in 
the gamesmanship of litigation.153  Strong sanctions provide both specific 
and general deterrence of bad faith conduct.154 
Post-judgment, these sanctions are ineffective—but the incentive for 
gamesmanship is that much stronger.  Accordingly, the initial determination 
of what assets could be available to satisfy the judgment or award cannot be 
placed in the debtor’s hands but must reside with the court.155 
5.   Cost and Abusive Practices 
Concerns about the “cost and delay” inherent in U.S. civil discovery have 
become ubiquitous, particularly with the rise of electronic discovery.156  
 
 150. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014). 
 151. Id. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 152. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also 8 
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The U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
convened a conference of lawyers, federal judges, and legal scholars to 
address exactly this issue in 2010 at Duke Law School.  The conference 
produced a proposed package of amendments to the Federal Rules to reduce 
these perceived evils.157  One conference paper observed that the Federal 
Rules’ stated goal “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action” may have become “an empty promise,” and 
that “[c]ivil litigation has become too cumbersome, expensive and time 
consuming, and the exponential growth of electronically stored 
information . . . over the past decade has simply added strains to an already 
overburdened system.”158 
Courts enforcing judgments do not typically concern themselves with the 
costs and expenses of the judgment debtor.  Quite the contrary—the 
judgment debtor is typically regarded as putting the creditor to further, 
unnecessary, and unjust expense by refusing to satisfy the judgment.159  
This conviction is reflected in the widespread adoption of post-judgment 
interest rates that, at present, typically exceed market returns.160  High post-
judgment interest rates compensate creditors for dispossession of their 
funds over the dispute’s length and prevent unjust enrichment of debtors.  
Post-judgment interest is also designed to promote speedy satisfaction of 
judgments and discourage post-judgment gamesmanship by debtors.161 
A third-party witness in enforcement proceedings, or even a garnishee, 
faces lower burdens than a defendant in a plenary proceeding.  One federal 
district court observed that “it is well recognized that merely making a 
submission to the court imposes a far less significant burden on that party 
than bringing the party into a lawsuit.”162  The court noted that a subpoena 
in aid of enforcement “imposes an even lighter burden than a typical 
subpoena, which may delve into aspects of a company’s business that are 
sensitive, and which may require extensive legal analysis as well as internal 
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resources in crafting objections and providing responses.”163  By contrast, 
for a subpoena in aid of enforcement:  “[T]here is no discovery being asked 
of the Garnishees beyond the amount of their indebtedness to the Judgment 
Debtor.  It is a question that can be answered in an instant.”164 
The concern for “abusive” practices is also recast.  Courts express great 
frustration with the various practices of scofflaw debtors—for example, 
fraudulent transfers—in an attempt to evade enforcement entirely or to 
force the creditors to settle for a significant discount off the face value of 
the judgment.  Legislatures also have gone to great lengths to corral 
recalcitrant debtors.  New York law, for example, provides not only for 
contempt sanctions for failure to obey a subpoena165 or a restraining 
notice,166 but also for arrest of a debtor concealing property if the debtor is 
about to leave the state or is concealed therein.167 
6.   Good and Bad Faith 
The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
placed the issue of transnational discovery front and center.  The 
Restatement devoted a separate section to transnational discovery, carving it 
off from jurisdiction to prescribe generally.168  This new section was 
motivated, in part, by the belief that “[n]o aspect of the extension of the 
American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States 
has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in 
investigation and litigation in the United States.”169  The Restatement’s new 
section, however, was principally (perhaps exclusively) concerned with 
“pretrial or investigative techniques,” particularly in antitrust cases.170 
The Restatement, in some respects, made life much harder for parties 
resisting U.S. discovery.  In particular, it made explicit that the threat of 
criminal sanctions by a foreign sovereign was not a sufficient basis to 
withhold discovery.171  But the Restatement gave to noncompliant targets 
of discovery in the same breadth that it took away.  The Restatement also 
added a “good faith” exception—in other words, that the discovery target 
could be excused from production after making good faith efforts to secure 
the compliance of the sovereign interposing objections to the discovery.172 
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It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a “good faith” judgment 
debtor would refuse to post a bond.  Of course, not all judgments and 
awards deserve to be enforced, hence the various provisions of judgment 
enforcement law173 and of the New York Convention that permit limited 
defenses to arbitral award enforcement.174  But for the court that has 
rendered the judgment, defenses to enforcement are irrelevant; for a court 
has already agreed to enforce a judgment, the time for defenses is past.  The 
only reason a debtor could have for refusing to post a bond, if it has assets 
sufficient to do so, is that it never intends to satisfy the judgment.  This 
hardly seems consistent with “good faith”—even if the debtor could make 
an apparently “good faith” attempt to secure clearance from the resistant 
sovereign to release documents. 
7.   Sovereign Interests 
The United States certainly has a strong interest in providing a forum for 
adjudication for a wide variety of cases.  The Restatement recognizes a non-
exhaustive list of these cases, including matters involving residents, 
nationals, and parties who have consented to jurisdiction in the United 
States.175  The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
the “the interests of the forum State” in narrowing both specific176 and 
general jurisdiction.177 
American states have also, in varying ways, expressed strong interests in 
providing a forum of adjudication.  For example, New York General 
Obligations Law section 5-1402 provides that any person can sue a foreign 
party in New York pursuant to a contract that provides for New York law 
and the jurisdiction of New York courts, if the amount in controversy is at 
least $1 million.178  New York law also bars any courts from dismissing 
such a suit under forum non conveniens.179 
The interest of a sovereign in ensuring enforcement of its judgments is 
also certainly strong.  Two federal courts of appeal have described this 
interest as “vital.”180  Whenever a court issues an order, it “has put its own 
prestige on the line to back up this commitment.”181  But it is not 
 
compulsion. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974 (RJS), 2011 WL 
6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011). 
 173. See Emilio Bettoni, Note, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money 
Judgments Despite the Lack of Assets, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 155, 157 (2013). 
 174. New York Convention, supra note 18. 
 175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 421. 
 176. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). 
 177. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2014) (“[R]espondents have failed 
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 178. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 2014). 
 179. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327(b) (McKinney 2014). 
 180. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th Cir. 
1992); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1280 
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immediately clear how strong this interest is where a U.S. court is 
recognizing and enforcing a foreign judgment or award. 
In the context of arbitral awards, the analysis may be somewhat simpler.  
Article III of the New York Convention provides that signatory states shall 
not “impose[] substantially more onerous conditions” on the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards than on enforcement of domestic awards.182  The 
United States might well violate its obligations under the Convention if its 
courts announced a doctrine whereby international awards were less likely 
to receive the full panoply of U.S. enforcement discovery than domestic 
awards.  In addition, current case law requires that an arbitral award cannot 
be enforced in the United States without a jurisdictional nexus, either 
through jurisdiction over the debtor or over its assets.183 
Even for judgments, however, the U.S. interest is greater in enforcing a 
foreign judgment than in adjudicating a purely foreign claim.  In the United 
States, judgment enforcement is governed by state law.  Although there is 
significant variation among state law approaches, they are fairly united as 
“generous forum[s] in which to enforce judgments for money damages 
rendered by foreign courts.”184  This is not noblesse oblige, but pure self-
interest.  As the New York Court of Appeals observed, New York’s 
judgment enforcement law “was designed to codify and clarify existing case 
law on the subject and, more importantly, to promote the efficient 
enforcement of New York judgments abroad by assuring foreign 
jurisdictions that their judgments would receive streamlined enforcement 
here.”185  American states have expressed their strong interest in providing 
foreign judgments with the full breadth of enforcement mechanisms in the 
hopes that foreign sovereigns will accord U.S. judgments the same 
courtesy. 
It is possible to understand the breadth of U.S. enforcement discovery in 
the same way—as an affirmative statement of policy that broad post-
judgment and post-award discovery should be a worldwide norm.  The U.S. 
Congress made exactly such a statement in passing the current version of 28 
U.S.C. § 1782, which provides for U.S.-style discovery in aid of 
proceedings before foreign tribunals.  The United States created this 
mechanism, which arguably disadvantages U.S.-based companies, “in the 
hopes that foreign countries would be encouraged to reciprocate with 
procedural improvements of their own.”186  U.S. laws on enforcement 
 
 182. New York Convention, supra note 18, at 2519. 
 183. See Silberman, supra note 130, at 444. 
 184. CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 792 N.E.2d 155, 159 (N.Y. 
2003). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing 
H.R. DOC. NO. 88-88, at 20 (1963)); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 
542 U.S. 241, 248 (2004) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 was the culmination of a process to 
“investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance and cooperation between the 
United States and foreign countries with a view to achieving improvements.” (quoting Act of 
Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743; S. Rep. No. 2392, at 3 (1958))). One 
federal district court has specifically held that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 is not limited to “claims-
based” discovery, but can also be used for “asset-based” discovery. In re Application of 
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discovery—for example, New York’s recent amendments to make clear the 
extraterritorial application of its enforcement subpoenas—could be 
construed as representing a similar U.S. interest. 
At the very least, this interest outstrips the U.S. interest in adjudicating 
the much maligned foreign-cubed action—a suit with foreign plaintiffs, 
foreign defendants, and foreign conduct.  The Supreme Court noted in its 
most recent curbs to both prescriptive187 and adjudicative188 jurisdiction 
that each case involved foreign parties and foreign conduct.  At a minimum, 
the U.S. interest in enforcing a purely foreign judgment likely exceeds its 
interest in adjudicating a purely foreign controversy.189 
The Restatement (and in turn, the Supreme Court) also assumed a basic 
comparative point:  that American discovery laws are far broader than, and 
in constant tension with, the vast majority of other nations’ discovery 
systems.  Much of the Restatement’s analysis was therefore motivated by a 
desire not to unreasonably aggravate sovereign tensions caused by this 
difference.  This may be true pretrial but perhaps not post-judgment.  The 
battle is not between American-style broad discovery and other nations’ 
focused document production but typically between a creditor from a state 
that endorses broad post-judgment discovery and a debtor from a state that 
also endorses broad post-judgment discovery.190 
The United Kingdom, for example, takes a famously robust approach to 
enforcement.  Justice Ginsburg observed as much in her dissent to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance 
Bond Fund,191 which held that due process bars “preliminary injunctions 
stopping a party sued for an unsecured debt from disposing of assets 
pending adjudication.”192  She noted that worldwide “preliminary asset-
 
Gorsoan Ltd. & Gazprombank OJSC for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 to Conduct 
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 188. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring 
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 189. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 190. For a comparative analysis of prejudgment enforcement mechanisms prepared by 
counsel for the Madoff trustee, see Timothy S. Pfeifer, Denise D. Vasel & Ralph A. 
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 191. 527 U.S. 308 (1999). 
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freeze injunctions have been available in English courts since the 1975 
Court of Appeal decision in Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. 
International Bulkcarriers S.A.”193  She also observed that “increasingly 
sophisticated foreign-haven judgment proofing strategies, coupled with 
technology that permits the nearly instantaneous transfer of assets abroad, 
suggests that defendants may succeed in avoiding meritorious claims in 
ways unimaginable before the merger of law and equity.”194  In 2013, the 
U.K. High Court reaffirmed the ability of English courts to issue worldwide 
discovery orders to any parties subject to its jurisdiction.195  The House of 
Lords did clarify, however, that a court’s discovery power did not extend to 
third parties entirely outside the court’s jurisdiction—a third party could not 
be compelled to travel to the United Kingdom to submit to jurisdiction and 
examination there.196 
Swiss law imposes a duty to disclose all the debtor’s assets, wherever 
located, on the debtor, any third parties holding the debtor’s assets, or any 
third parties who simply have information about the debtor’s assets.197  
Failure to do so may subject the debtor or third parties to criminal 
sanctions.  Germany and Portugal have inquisitorial enforcement systems, 
where an unsatisfied judgment is referred to a court officer who is 
empowered to examine the debtor and to search various government records 
for information on the debtor’s assets.  If these fail to produce assets to 
satisfy the judgment, the enforcement officer is empowered to make an 
application to the court to seek information from third parties.198  Just this 
snapshot of foreign approaches to post-judgment discovery suggests broad 
agreement that all information about the debtor’s assets, even in the hands 
of third parties, is generally available.  This relatively broad approach 
stands in stark contrast to the pretrial discovery system of, by way of 
example, Germany, which has none.199 
 
 193. Id. at 339 (citing [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509). 
 194. Id. at 338–39 (citing Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 32–
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 199. Gregory P. Sreenan & Jeffrey B. Shalek, Blocking Statutes and Their Effect on 
American-Style Discovery Abroad, BRIEF, Fall 1995, at 59–60 (“Germany’s system is set up 
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As for sovereigns, the NML Court does seem to have made clear that 
U.S. courts should not look to provide more protections than those 
conferred in the FSIA itself.  The U.S. Congress has enacted a 
“comprehensive” scheme governing claims against foreign sovereigns and 
foreign sovereign instrumentalities.200  The FSIA provides both 
jurisdictional immunities and, even if those are waived, immunities from 
execution.201  Given the ample protections provided by Congress, and the 
“comprehensive” nature of the statute, U.S. courts repeatedly have declined 
to engraft further protections for defendant sovereigns onto Congress’s 
scheme.202  Indeed, the NML majority took exactly this tack.203  To the 
extent that the United States has a sovereign interest in refraining from 
ordering discovery of sovereign assets, it is firmly up to the political 
branches to enact such restrictions. 
B.   NML and Extraterritorial Discovery 
The two strands of thought in U.S case law stem from two contested 
theoretical planks in enforcement discovery.  The majority position among 
U.S. courts rests on two propositions:  first, that discovery and execution 
are separate, and second, that creditors enjoy a strong presumption in favor 
of extraterritorial enforcement discovery.  The minority position largely 
flows from a tendency to treat merits and enforcement discovery as 
essentially similar. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the NML majority channels the principles of 
broad transnational enforcement discovery without directly invoking them 
(in part, because the majority accepted the funds’ argument that Argentina 
waived any argument regarding the breadth of Rule 69 and relied solely on 
the FSIA).  The majority stated simply that it would be improper to 
interpose any of the FSIA restrictions before the funds even knew what 
property was potentially available for seizure.204  This simple statement 
implies a strong commitment to disclosure of any assets by the debtor, 
anywhere in the world, before the sorting of seizable from immune assets 
begins.  It also necessarily dictates that this sorting will be done by the court 
and not by the debtor when it responds to discovery requests. 
These principles enable a rigorous examination of two prominent 
obstacles to worldwide enforcement discovery:  restrictions on discovery 
and restrictions on execution.  It also sheds light on one of the mysteries of 
the NML opinions.  Two of the Court’s most analyzed international law 
opinions in recent memory—Morrison v. National Australia Bank205 and 
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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum206—hold that “[w]hen a statute gives no 
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”207   
Yet, neither Morrison nor Kiobel makes any appearance in the NML 
opinions.  (It was raised at argument, albeit briefly.208)  It may be that the 
majority simply regarded it as waived, although the Court’s enthusiasm to 
reach the issue in Kiobel suggests that sudden restraint on this front is 
unlikely.  That leaves two possibilities.  The first is that perhaps long-
standing practice (as in the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws) 
still can influence that analysis of whether a statute applies abroad.  The 
Court echoed, without directly invoking, decades of federal court case law 
setting out a strong presumption in favor of extraterritorial enforcement 
discovery.  Perhaps this strong presumption played a role in the Court’s 
decision not to address the issue. 
The other possibility highlights the importance of state law in 
enforcement discovery.  Rule 69(a)(2) states:  “In aid of the judgment or 
execution, the judgment creditor or a successor in interest whose interest 
appears of record may obtain discovery from any person—including the 
judgment debtor—as provided in these rules or by the procedure of the state 
where the court is located.”209  The rule permits the creditor to seek 
discovery under either federal law or the applicable state law.  (State law, 
per Rule 69(a)(1), provides the applicable execution procedures.)  Morrison 
and Kiobel are opinions about federal statutory construction.  They are not 
more than that.  States are entitled to, and do, have their own policies 
regarding extraterritoriality.  Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals 
recently made plain that the extraterritorial reach of federal and state 
antitrust law should not be “viewed as coextensive.”210 
Indeed, the subpoenas at issue in NML were issued under New York law.  
New York courts, as described above, have long taken a robustly 
extraterritorial approach to enforcement discovery.  In fact, the New York 
legislature specifically enacted C.P.L.R. 5224(a-1) to “establish[] the 
extraterritorial reach of a subpoena duces tecum.”211  Morrison and Kiobel 
impose no bar.  This not only answers one of many mysteries of the NML 
opinions, but also makes plain that the strong presumption in favor of 
extraterritorial enforcement discovery comes at least as much from the 
states as from the federal government. 
 
 206. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 207. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255. 
 208. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 50. 
 209. FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2). 
 210. Global Reinsurance Corp. U.S. Branch v. Equitas Ltd., 969 N.E.2d 187, 196 (N.Y. 
2012) (“For a Donnelly Act claim to reach a purely extraterritorial conspiracy, there would, 
we think, have to be a very close nexus between the conspiracy and injury to competition in 
this state.”). 
 211. CE Int’l Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P’ship, No. 12-CV-
08087(CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013). 
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II.   RESTRICTIONS ON DISCOVERY 
Transnational asset discovery typically runs into two roadblocks:  
restrictions on discovery and restrictions on execution.  Certainly the 
challenges of these two types of restrictions are different, but they both 
constitute the expression of a sovereign that certain assets should be 
shielded from the judgment enforcement process. 
Foreign blocking statutes—laws aimed at preventing disclosure of certain 
information in the face of discovery requests coming from other 
sovereigns—have seen a great deal of analysis from both courts and 
commentators.  Indeed, the subject is treated at length in the Third 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States212 and in the 
Supreme Court’s Aerospatiale decision.213  These sources, however, are 
concerned exclusively with pretrial discovery.  Despite the fact that many of 
their concerns and conclusions pertain only to pretrial discovery, they have 
been extended into the post-judgment realm without sufficient appreciation 
for the significant differences between discovery designed to adjudicate a 
claim and discovery designed to promote satisfaction of an award or 
judgment.  Indeed, Justice Ginsburg referred to Aerospatiale for the 
proposition that U.S. discovery is typically broader than that permitted by 
other nations.214  True, pretrial; post-judgment, perhaps not so. 
A.   The Aerospatiale Test:  A Tool Designed for Pretrial Discovery 
Foreign restrictions on discovery may embody many policy values, such 
as bank secrecy215 or personal data privacy.216  States also may enact them 
“[a]s a classic form of asset protection” designed to “disentitle judgment 
creditors from access to financial information that describes the assets, and 
identifies the custodian for purposes of enforcement,” with the purpose of 
“deliberately hobbl[ing] the judgment creditors’ attempts to discover and 
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reach assets.”217  These enactments are commonly termed foreign 
“blocking” statutes. 
Blocking statutes are the most common and most discussed obstacle to 
transnational discovery.  The Supreme Court took up their effect on pretrial 
merits discovery in its 1987 Aerospatiale decision, where the Court held the 
U.S. discovery requests demanding documents located abroad did not 
necessarily offend foreign “judicial sovereignty.”218  The Court noted:  
“The French ‘blocking statute’ does not alter our conclusion.  It is well 
settled that such statutes do not deprive an American court of the power to 
order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the 
act of production may violate that statute.”219  Simply put, “American 
courts are not required to adhere blindly to the directives of such a 
statute.”220 
In commenting on the French blocking statute, the Court recognized an 
important principle at work in the push-and-pull between discovery and 
blocking statutes:  “Extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction are not one-
sided.”221  A U.S. discovery order may “have some impact in France,” 
while “the French blocking statute asserts similar authority over acts to take 
place in this country.”222  A U.S. court certainly need not defer to such a 
foreign statute where it seeks “to provide the nationals of such a country 
with a preferred status in our courts” and “[i]t would be particularly 
incongruous to recognize such a preference for corporations that are wholly 
owned by the enacting nation.”223  The French blocking statute, “if taken 
literally, would appear to represent an extraordinary exercise of legislative 
jurisdiction by the Republic of France over a United States district judge, 
forbidding him or her to order any discovery from a party of French 
nationality.”224 
Rather than set out a bright-line rule,225 the Court laid out a non-
exhaustive list of relevant factors, essentially adopting the test proposed in 
the Restatement.226  The Court looked to:  (1) the importance of the 
information to the proceedings; (2) the specificity of the request; 
(3) whether the information originated in the United States; (4) whether the 
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3328 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
information could be obtained in another way; and (5) a balancing of the 
national interests of the United States against that of the foreign sovereign 
where the information is held.227 
The Court raised several concerns for lower courts to bear in mind when 
considering “[t]he exact line between reasonableness and 
unreasonableness.”228  The Court observed that “[s]ome discovery 
procedures are much more ‘intrusive’ than others” and contrasted “an 
interrogatory asking petitioners to identify the pilots who flew flight tests” 
with “a request to produce all of the ‘design specifications, line drawings 
and engineering plans and all engineering change orders and plans and all 
drawings.’”229 
The Court then urged “American courts, in supervising pretrial 
proceedings,” to “exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from 
the danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place 
them in a disadvantageous position.”230  The Court noted that “[j]udicial 
supervision of discovery should always seek to minimize its costs and 
inconvenience and to prevent improper uses of discovery requests,” and that 
“[w]hen it is necessary to seek evidence abroad, however, the district court 
must supervise pretrial proceedings particularly closely to prevent 
discovery abuses.”231  By way of example, the Court noted that “the 
additional cost of transportation of documents or witnesses to or from 
foreign locations may increase the danger that discovery may be sought for 
the improper purpose of motivating settlement, rather than finding relevant 
and probative evidence.”232  Thus, “[o]bjections to ‘abusive’ discovery that 
foreign litigants advance should therefore receive the most careful 
consideration.”233 
Overall, the Court turned to the then-current draft of the Restatement—
itself concerned only with pretrial discovery—to urge lower courts to 
exercise caution:  “[N]o aspect of the extension of the American legal 
system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to 
so much friction as the request for documents associated with investigation 
and litigation in the United States.”234 
B.   Using a Pretrial Tool for Post-Judgment Problems 
The Court’s repeated emphasis on “pretrial proceedings” is telling.  Each 
of the concerns noted by the Court either fall away or are greatly 
diminished post-judgment.  Nevertheless, lower courts have applied the 
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Aerospatiale test to post-trial enforcement discovery without significant 
modification—albeit typically with some generosity toward the judgment 
creditor. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit took up “a number of difficult questions 
regarding a sensitive area of law and foreign relations” posed by a request 
for transnational enforcement discovery.235  An American corporation “won 
a default judgment for fraud and breach of contract against . . . a 
corporation organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and an arm of the PRC government.”236  The creditor served several 
discovery requests on the debtor attempting to gain information in its 
“assets worldwide.”237  After some delay, the debtor sought guidance from 
the PRC government on how the PRC’s State Secrecy Act applied to the 
requests and was informed “that almost all of its financial information was 
classified a state secret and could not be disclosed.”238 
The Ninth Circuit applied the standard Aerospatiale analysis.  In 
considering the importance of the documents, the court noted:  “[T]he 
information sought is not only relevant to the execution of the judgment, it 
is crucial.  Without information as to [the debtor]’s assets, [the creditor] 
cannot hope to enforce the judgment.  The execution proceedings, and in 
some sense the underlying judgment itself, will be rendered 
meaningless.”239  On the other hand, the court noted that the debtor “has no 
United States office,” that “[a]ll of its employees, and all of the documents” 
requested are located in the PRC, and that “[t]his factor weighs against 
requiring disclosure.”240 
The debtor did not assert that the information could be obtained from 
another source.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that, even if the creditor 
could obtain information from the debtor’s parent corporation, it would not 
contain the “core financial information” to which the creditor was 
entitled.241  The court stated:  “[The creditor] appears to have done 
everything in its power to collect information which will enable it to 
enforce the judgment.  To date, it has been unsuccessful.  The absence of 
other sources for the information [the creditor] seeks is a factor which 
weighs strongly in favor of compelling disclosure.”242 
In considering the balance of national interests, the court noted that the 
United States has a “substantial” interest “in vindicating the rights of 
American plaintiffs” and a “vital” interest “in enforcing the judgments of its 
courts.”243  On the PRC side of the ledger, the PRC had specifically 
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admonished the debtor not to turn over the documents.244  Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that the PRC had expressed no hesitation about disclosing 
the information voluntarily for marketing purposes prior to the litigation 
and that “[t]he only likely ‘adverse’ effect on the PRC economy will be that 
[the creditor] may be able to collect its judgment, something the PRC has 
no legitimate state interest in preventing.”245 
The Ninth Circuit went on to consider the hardship to the debtor, 
invoking the Supreme Court’s admonition that threat of criminal 
prosecution is a “weighty excuse” for nonproduction.246  The court noted 
that the debtor “has in fact been ordered by the Chinese government to 
withhold the information, and has been told that it will bear the ‘legal 
consequences’ of disclosing the information,” and that it “therefore seems 
to be placed in a difficult position, between the Scylla of contempt 
sanctions and the Charybdis of possible criminal prosecution.”247  But the 
court dismissed this concern, stating that the debtor always holds the keys 
to its own salvation:  “[T]he discovery dispute arose only because [the 
debtor] refused to post a supersedeas bond or letter of credit to stay 
execution of the judgment pending appeal, as required by [Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure] 62(d).”248  The court noted that the debtor “even now 
could post a supersedeas bond pending the outcome of its petition for 
certiorari, or it could pay the judgment,” and that “[e]ither of these courses 
of action would keep it from having to violate either the district court’s 
orders or the PRC’s laws.”249 
Finally, the court considered whether the “discovery order is likely to be 
unenforceable, and therefore to have no practical effect,” noting that, if so, 
“that factor counsels against requiring compliance with the order.”250  The 
court concluded that “[i]n this case, it may be impossible to force [the 
debtor] to comply,” and that “[t]he imposition of sanctions in the amount of 
$10,000 a day, sanctions which have already grown larger than the 
underlying judgment, has failed to move” them:  “Compliance therefore 
seems unlikely, a factor counseling against compelling discovery.”251 
Nonetheless, the court noted that “the discovery and contempt orders 
may be of some significance.”252  The court observed that, although the 
debtor “apparently has no assets in the United States, it has in the past done 
substantial business in this country” and that “[s]hould it wish to do 
business here in the future, it would have to pay the judgment or risk having 
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its assets seized and its business interrupted.”253  The court also expressed 
some optimism that “a clear statement that foreign corporations which avail 
themselves of business opportunities in the United States must abide by 
United States laws might have a substantial effect on the way [the debtor] 
and other corporations do business in the United States in the future.”254  In 
sum, the court concluded that, although “full compliance by [the debtor] 
with the order of the district court is unlikely,” the “order may nonetheless 
produce partial compliance, and might be effective in other ways as well” 
and that, “[w]hile the likelihood of noncompliance does weigh against 
compelling disclosure, we think the weight of this factor is lessened by 
these mitigating circumstances.”255 
In the end, the court held that “the balance tips significantly (although not 
overwhelmingly)” in the creditor’s favor and upheld the subpoenas.256  
Notably, the court’s language suggested its conception of the judgment as 
essentially transnational in nature:  “[The creditor] can seek to execute the 
judgment in whatever foreign courts have jurisdiction over [the debtor’s] 
assets, but [the creditor] needs discovery in order to determine which courts 
those are.”257 
Some judgment creditors have not been so fortunate.  The Seventh 
Circuit upheld a district court’s refusal to compel post-judgment 
interrogatories “in favor of Romania’s laws protecting national secrecy.”258  
An American creditor obtained a default judgment against a Romanian 
debtor—both reinsurance companies—and sought to discover assets both 
inside and outside Romania. 
Judge Bauer, writing for the panel, proceeded to balance the “vital 
national interests” at stake.  The court allowed that “the courts of the United 
States undoubtedly have a vital interest in providing a forum for the final 
resolution of disputes and for enforcing these judgments,” but held that 
“[t]his rather general interest, however, is not as compelling as,” to name a 
few examples, protection of U.S. patents or antitrust policy, or cases where 
the United States is a party.259  The court observed that this case was a mere 
“private dispute between two reinsurance corporations,” in which “[t]he 
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disputed materials are the subject of a post-judgment interrogatory request 
and not vital to the case-in-chief.”260  In such a case, although “there is 
unquestionably a vital national interest in protecting the finality of 
judgments and meaningfully enforcing these decisions, this interest alone 
does not rise to the level of those found in” other cases.261 
Against this, the court weighed “the Romanian interest in protecting its 
state and so-called ‘service’ secrets,” noting that, “[g]iven the scope of its 
protective laws and the strict penalties it imposes for any violation, 
Romania places a high price on this secrecy.”262  The court observed that 
“[u]nlike a blocking statute, Romania’s law appears to be directed at 
domestic affairs rather than merely protecting Romanian corporations from 
foreign discovery requests” and held that, “[g]iven this choice between the 
relative interests of Romania in its national secrecy and the American 
interest in enforcing its judicial decisions, we have determined that 
Romania’s, at least on the facts before us, appears to be the more immediate 
and compelling.”263 
The court then went on to consider the hardship to the Romanian debtor, 
noting that “[t]hose persons forced to comply with this discovery order 
would be Romanian citizens subject to the criminal sanctions of the law 
protecting state secrets.”264  The court placed great weight on this factor, 
notwithstanding the Restatement’s view that criminal penalties alone are 
not sufficient to refuse a request for discovery. 
Judge Easterbrook wrote separately to express serious frustration with the 
court’s decision.  Judge Easterbrook observed that the recently defunct 
Romanian regime had declared everything “secret.”265  The debtor invoked 
“Romania’s secrecy laws, which forbid it to disclose any information in its 
hands, even information about assets located outside Romania.”266  The 
“effect is that no judgment against Romania may be collected.”267  Judge 
Easterbrook observed that the debtor is an arm of the Romanian state, that 
the United States would permit execution against its assets under the FSIA, 
and that the FSIA should “eclipse[] any attempt by the foreign defendant to 
create its preferred list by using its domestic secrecy law.”268  In short, “[i]f 
we allow foreign states to exempt themselves after the fashion of (the old) 
Romania, we might as well forget about the FSIA.”269 
Judge Easterbrook also took issue with the court’s statement that “a suit 
by the government is ‘more important’ than private litigation.”270  Rather, 
“enforcement of contracts is a subject of the first magnitude,” and, in 
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addition, “[t]he gravity of the nation’s interest is no less when it decides to 
enforce vital rules through private initiative.”271  The majority’s analysis 
further breaks down when a “judgment has been rendered and the 
prevailing party seeks to discover assets,” a “problem[] which the 
Restatement does not discuss.”272  Judge Easterbook concluded:  “A 
prevailing party is entitled to relief; so much has been determined by the 
judgment.  At this point resort to secrecy laws does nothing but nullify the 
rendering nation’s substantive law.”273 
These cases demonstrate a principle that should be readily apparent:  
pretrial and post-judgment discovery are very different creatures.  Neither 
the Aerospatiale test, nor the Restatement approach on which it was based, 
were designed with the post-judgment enforcement discovery in mind.  At a 
minimum, transnational asset discovery requires substantial modification to 
the approach taken by the Supreme Court and the Restatement. 
C.   A Post-Judgment Approach for Enforcement Discovery 
The uncritical extension of Aerospatiale’s pretrial discovery framework 
to post-judgment asset discovery is problematic and unwarranted.  In 
Aerospatiale, the Court viewed itself as stepping foot into very dangerous 
waters—the perceived conflict between broad American pretrial discovery 
and more restrictive approaches typically used elsewhere.  The Restatement 
expressed similar trepidation, observing that no body of American law had 
provoked more conflict than American discovery.274 
Accordingly, the Court emphasized caution for pretrial discovery:  
“American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise 
special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that 
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a 
disadvantageous position” and when evidence is demanded abroad, “the 
district court must supervise pretrial proceedings particularly closely to 
prevent discovery abuses.”275  The Court then emphasized that, while courts 
should always be mindful of cost and expense in the pretrial discovery 
process, the costs may be even higher where documents and witnesses must 
be transported from abroad and, accordingly, there will be greater scrutiny 
of any claims that “abusive” discovery practices are being used to force a 
settlement.276  When a foreign state or foreign sovereign instrumentality is 
concerned, caution is all the more important.277 
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These concerns articulated by the Aerospatiale Court fall away, or at 
least diminish considerably, in the context of post-judgment enforcement 
discovery.  Accordingly, the test announced by the Court should be 
substantially modified.  As discussed above, there is a strong presumption 
that the judgment creditor is entitled to “free rein”278 to seek “all matter 
relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment.”279 
Simply put, the private factors announced by the Court in Aerospatiale 
have little or no applicability to post-judgment enforcement discovery 
against debtors.  Against third-party garnishees, they only have relevance 
where the third party could not have reasonably anticipated being subject to 
competing demands from different sovereigns (at least, if the law of 
discovery is to be brought into line with the law of asset seizures, as seems 
sensible). 
The Supreme Court recognized in its recent decision in Atlantic Marine 
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court280 that the private factors normally 
present in a court’s decision to grant a transfer or a motion for forum non 
conveniens dismissal are irrelevant when the parties have consented to a 
forum selection agreement.281  A judgment is a compulsory contract created 
by the court between creditor and debtor—similar to an equitable trust, the 
court creates the relationship between the parties.  The debtor is bound to 
deliver a sum certain to the creditor.  Failure to do so subjects it to 
penalties, such as statutory post-judgment interest.  For arbitral awards, this 
relationship is even stronger, as the arbitral tribunal necessarily draws its 
power from the actual consent of the parties, whereas a court may draw it 
from presence, purposeful availment, or targeting of the jurisdiction where 
the court sits.  When this involuntary contract forms, unlike pretrial 
discovery, there seems no reason to attend to the private factors of the 
Aerospatiale test for a debtor. 
III.   RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTION 
Foreign discovery restrictions are not the only obstacle to transnational 
asset discovery.  The question that split the federal courts of appeals and, 
later, the Supreme Court, was subtly different.  Post-judgment asset 
discovery must be “relevant” to satisfying the judgment.  If an asset cannot 
be seized, sold, and applied to a judgment, it cannot be “relevant” to 
satisfaction of a judgment.  If a statute provides that a certain class of assets 
is exempt from execution, they cannot be “relevant” to satisfaction of a 
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judgment.282  Homestead exemptions are the classic example; indeed, 
Justice Scalia raised them at oral argument in the NML case.283 
This seems simple enough.  Unfortunately, that is where the simplicity 
ends.  The NML argument and opinions raised this issue in a particular 
context—the FSIA’s restrictions on execution on assets owned by a foreign 
sovereign or by a foreign sovereign instrumentality.  The FSIA provides 
several such exemptions, for example, for assets directly owned by a 
foreign state that are not used for a commercial purpose.284  The entire 
controversy before the Court could be summarized as:  Do these 
exemptions have any relevance to discovery? 
Restrictions on execution, both foreign and domestic, have not before 
been analyzed as a conflict of laws problem.  The split in the NML opinions 
highlights this gap.  The majority ignores the problem, essentially adopting 
(without referring to) the line of authority holding that discovery is separate 
from execution.  This is a simple—and perhaps the best—rule, but it cannot 
stand ipse dixit, particularly in light of the requirement that discovery be 
“relevant” to satisfaction on an award.285  This rule would seem to require 
more support than the majority’s somewhat casual assertion that the debtor 
needs to find out what property is available before litigating issues of 
executability.286  Perhaps, but what then? 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent grapples with the issue, arguing that domestic 
exemptions from execution should be extended abroad, at least for 
sovereigns, at least presumptively.287  This is a modest rule, but it too 
overlooks the unique concerns of post-judgment enforcement discovery.  
To take one example:  Whose law applies to an asset that can move, rapidly 
and at the will of the debtor, from state to state?288  A functioning judgment 
enforcement system cannot accept the answer that an asset’s mere and 
perhaps temporary presence in a state that would shield it is sufficient to 
defeat post-judgment asset discovery. 
The Court unanimously rejected Argentina’s chief argument, that the 
FSIA, which says nothing explicit about discovery, contains an implicit 
restriction on discovery.289  But Justice Ginsburg split from her colleagues 
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on a subtler distinction.  In her dissent, she maintained that U.S. courts 
should presumptively look to U.S. law as a guide for which assets are 
available for execution—if they are immune, discovery should be barred as 
not relevant to satisfaction of the judgment.  The majority assumed, without 
deciding, that extraterritorial post-judgment discovery is typically 
appropriate and that, at any rate, imposing an evidentiary burden on the 
creditor before it has any idea what the debtor owns would be premature. 
This disagreement highlighted an issue that has thus far been unexplored:  
When should exemptions on execution restrict transnational asset 
discovery?  Or more to the point:  Whose exemptions should restrict 
discovery?  There are at least four possibilities:  (1) Never and nobody’s.  
This was the approach assumed by the majority.  (2) The exemptions of the 
court ordering discovery—in NML, the U.S. court—should govern 
worldwide.  This was Justice Ginsburg’s approach.  (3) The exemptions of 
the state where the asset currently sits should govern.  (4) And lastly, that 
exemptions should only restrict transnational discovery where essentially 
every jurisdiction would bar seizure of a particular class of assets (perhaps, 
for example, consular property). 
The NML majority assumed the first rule while Justice Ginsburg adopted 
the second—but with neither opinion considering the issues implicated by 
the choice. 
A.   The “Sky May Be the Limit” 
In the NML decision, the Supreme Court assumed (and the government 
conceded) that, in the ordinary case, “the district court would have been 
within its discretion to order the discovery from third-party banks about the 
judgment debtor’s assets located outside the United States.”290  In her 
dissent, Justice Ginsburg decried this as assuming that the “sky may be the 
limit.”291  Justice Ginsburg observed that property must be subject to 
attachment to be “relevant” to judgment satisfaction and therefore 
discoverable and, from that premise, argued that U.S. courts should look to 
their own laws for any assumptions about which property is subject to 
execution.  For example, under the FSIA, sovereign property not used for 
commercial purposes or not in the territorial United States would be 
excluded.292 
Justice Ginsburg’s objection has intuitive appeal.  In some quarters, U.S. 
courts have a reputation for riding roughshod over foreign law.293  Foreign 
states have, on some occasions, complained of rough treatment at the hands 
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of U.S. courts (Argentina being a recent, and vocal, example).294  One 
could easily count this admittedly bold assumption of authority as another 
example of American legal adventurism. 
But, in the context of transnational post-judgment enforcement 
discovery, the majority’s approach has much to recommend it.  First, it fits 
well with the realities of post-judgment enforcement discovery practice.  
Second, it avoids a potentially troubling extension of U.S. law—in this 
instance, U.S. law on property exemptions from execution—to other 
nations. 
The NML Court did not particularly concern itself with the on-the-ground 
realities of post-judgment enforcement discovery.  But the majority’s 
generous assumption comports well with established practices from lower 
courts.  Post-judgment discovery requests are necessarily broad—typically 
“all assets”—and without qualification.  Limitations, such as, say, “all 
assets that are not consular in nature,” would place in the debtor’s hands the 
ability to make determinations about what assets are or are not consular—in 
other words, which assets are available to satisfy a potential judgment.  As 
discussed above, this is unacceptable in post-judgment discovery, where it 
is more likely that the producing party is acting in bad faith and, at the same 
time, there are few means to deter bad faith conduct.  Although garnishees 
are not assumed to be acting in bad faith, they are typically considered to 
have less at stake—they are simply holding the debtor’s assets, without any 
direct interest in them. 
In addition, the due process interests of the parties apply pressure to keep 
discovery requests in merits proceedings from becoming pure “fishing 
expeditions.”  These interests are reduced or extinguished post-judgment.  
When a party goes from defendant to debtor, its due process interests are 
necessarily diminished in a variety of ways, including its interest in being 
free from broad discovery requests.295 
B.   Domestic Exemptions Abroad 
The heart of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent are her statements that “[a] court 
in the United States has no warrant to indulge the assumption that, outside 
our country, the sky may be the limit for attaching a foreign sovereign’s 
property in order to execute a U.S. judgment against the foreign sovereign,” 
and therefore, “[w]ithout proof of any kind that other nations broadly 
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expose a foreign sovereign’s property to arrest, attachment or execution, a 
more modest assumption is in order.”296 
These statements essentially set forth two principles:  first, that the 
United States should extend its law of exemptions from execution to other 
nations (at least for sovereigns and their instrumentalities), and second, that 
judgment creditors should have the initial burden of proving that foreign 
law would permit execution against these assets if it would be barred under 
U.S. law. 
The most natural defense of Justice Ginsburg’s proposed rule is that it is 
merely a presumption in favor of the debtor when U.S. law would shield the 
debtor’s assets from execution.  But this approach overlooks the differences 
between merits and enforcement discovery and, in doing so, comes into 
conflict with the purposes of the FSIA. 
Numerous courts have held that general discovery against foreign 
sovereigns necessarily must be limited unless a plaintiff can establish that 
the FSIA’s jurisdictional immunity does not apply—otherwise being 
subjected to the cost and inconvenience of U.S.-style discovery would 
devalue that very immunity.297  This poses “something of a chicken and egg 
problem” as the discovery may be necessary to uncover the very facts that 
would support a waiver of jurisdictional immunity.298 
This problem would be even more acute in post-judgment enforcement 
discovery.  Under Justice Ginsburg’s proposed rule, a creditor would have 
to show, before obtaining any asset discovery, that sovereign assets both 
were used for a commercial purpose and located in the United States.  This 
showing would likely be impossible, particularly for intangible assets that 
have no readily ascertainable situs (such as the very assets at issue in NML).  
In practice, the availability of assets for execution would be a matter for the 
political branches.  It was the stated purpose of the FSIA to take litigation 
and execution against sovereigns out of the hands of the political 
branches.299 
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C.   Foreign Exemptions at Home 
But these objections are simply answered:  shift the presumption; place 
the burden of showing immunity from execution on the debtor, not the 
creditor.  This squarely raises the question of whose law should apply to the 
execution—or the eventual possibility of execution—against a debtor’s 
assets.  Many assets can move from place to place.  Some assets have no 
“place.”300 
It is not at all clear that the exemptions from execution of the state where 
the asset happens to be located should apply to bar discovery.  Post-
judgment asset discovery only can be had for those assets that are 
“relevant” to satisfaction of the judgment—but this typically includes all 
assets that could be applied to the judgment.  This obligation is not only 
geographically broad, it is also temporally broad—it applies to assets that 
are now or could become seizable.  This temporal breadth is embodied in 
the continuing obligation of debtors and garnishees subject to post-
judgment asset discovery.  By contrast, pre-judgment asset discovery 
captures only those assets that a party has at the moment of service.  Post-
judgment asset discovery is forever—or at least lasts until the judgment is 
satisfied or expires. 
This temporal breadth of post-judgment asset discovery would then 
suggest that if an asset could in the future become subject to execution, it 
should be subject to asset discovery.  It is therefore not sufficient simply to 
say that the debtor must have the burden of showing that its asset is in a 
state that would not execute on the asset because of its law on exemptions 
from execution.  The debtor would have to show that there was no way that 
the asset could become subject to execution by, for example, moving to 
another jurisdiction without the same exemption. 
Real property would seem like an obvious candidate.  But asset discovery 
is intended not only to uncover the existence of the asset but also all 
information relevant to seizure of the asset.  This is particularly true for 
information that pertains to who owns or controls the asset, for example, 
asset tracing information.301 
Valuable real property is seldom directly owned.302  A creditor could 
very reasonably demand information related to real property in a state that 
exempts it from execution in the hopes of finding that it is owned through 
corporate entities that could open it up to de facto seizure by, for example, 
seizing membership interests in the corporate entity that holds the property 
(or the interests in the corporate entity that owns the corporate entity that 
owns the corporate entity that owns the real property).  By seizing and 
selling those interests, the creditor could effectively sell the real property 
and apply its value to the outstanding judgment. 
 
 300. See Simowitz, supra note 79. 
 301. See, e.g., In re Williams, 328 S.W.3d 103, 118, 120 (Tex. App. 2010). 
 302. See James W. Reynolds, Get Real:  Using LLCs to Invest in Property, BUS. L. 
TODAY, Mar.–Apr. 1995, at 44 (“Prior to the advent of limited liability companies, 
partnerships (both general and limited) and, to a lesser extent, S corporations were the legal 
forms traditionally favored for organizing closely held investments in real property.”). 
3340 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
This is not the only complication that would bedevil this approach.  U.S. 
legislatures and courts have long been clear that a debtor, subject to the 
court’s in personam power, can be compelled to bring assets into the 
jurisdiction.303  Once within the territorial borders of the enforcing state, the 
asset can be executed upon, in other words, seized by the sheriffs or 
marshals, sold, and applied to the judgment.  The New York Court of 
Appeals recently expanded this principle to encompass garnishees as well.  
In its decision in Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda,304 the court made clear that a 
garnishee holding the debtor’s assets can be compelled to deliver them into 
New York, even if the debtor is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New 
York.305 
And so the debtor’s burden would increase.  The debtor would have to 
show that the asset was located in a jurisdiction with an applicable 
exemption from execution, that the asset was owned in such a way that did 
render it effectively subject to seizure through some upstream ownership 
interest, and that the asset could not be delivered into the enforcing court’s 
hands, either by the debtor or a garnishee. 
At argument, Justice Scalia raised the classic property immunity from 
execution:  the homestead exemption.306  To take that example:  a debtor 
could show that she owned her mansion directly, that it was in a state with 
an applicable homestead exemption, and that the mansion was not capable 
of being moved (presumably the easiest showing of the three).  That would 
render the mansion not “relevant” to satisfaction of the judgment.  Perhaps 
this would be cold comfort to the debtor resisting asset discovery—she 
would have to reveal quite a bit of information simply to block further 
discovery.  But some important information, such as valuation, still could 
be shielded. 
D.   An International Exemptions Norm 
The extension of domestic exemptions from execution appears 
unreasonable; the recognition of foreign exemptions fraught with 
complications.  This leaves a fourth and final possibility:  that the debtor 
 
 303. In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., No. 96 Civ. 5567 (RPP), 2001 WL 123807, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2001) (out-of-state bank accounts); Miller v. Doniger, 814 N.Y.S.2d 141, 
141 (App. Div. 2006) (out-of-state bank account); Starbare II Partners, L.P. v. Sloan, 629 
N.Y.S.2d 23, 23 (App. Div. 1995) (out-of-state artworks); see also David Gray Carlson, 
Critique of Money Judgment (Part Two:  Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 43, 189–90 (2009) (“The rule that emerges from Grupo Mexicano is that 
persons over whom a court has jurisdiction can be ordered to fetch property located outside 
New York.  In In re Gaming Lottery Securities Litigation, the court did not hesitate in 
ordering a judgment debtor to collect an amount due from a Scottish bank and bring the 
proceeds into New York.”). 
 304. 911 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 2009). 
 305. Id. at 831. 
 306. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. See generally George L. Haskins, 
Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (1950) (“Most jurisdictions in the 
United States have legislative provisions, commonly referred to as homestead laws, designed 
to protect the family home from the reach of certain classes of creditors and to prevent 
alienation by the owner without the consent of his spouse.”). 
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could show that no state would permit execution on a particular asset.  Or, 
perhaps, that even if a handful of states would permit such an execution, 
exemption from execution is so widespread as to constitute customary 
international law. 
In theory, this is an appealing limiting principle.  After a creditor 
propounded a request for asset discovery, a debtor could reveal the 
existence of an asset, a customary international law norm that the asset 
would be immune from execution, and enough information to establish that 
the asset falls into this category.  The debtor could avoid disclosing the 
same information protected under the third approach (e.g., valuation), as 
well some of the thornier topics of ownership and mobility. 
The challenge would be in proving up the supposed customary 
international norm of freedom from execution.  Proving up any sort of 
customary international law in disputes between purely private parties, or 
even disputes involving a sovereign, is notoriously tricky.307 
This may be one area in which sovereigns have a distinct advantage.  
Justice Ginsburg writes that U.S. courts should look to domestic law as a 
“guide” because “our law coincides with the international norm.”308  She 
cites the “Findings and Declaration of Purpose” of the FSIA, which states 
that, “[u]nder international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction 
of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and 
their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of 
judgments rendered against them in connection with their commercial 
activities.”309 
This may not have been accurate in 1976 and may not be accurate now.  
But if the initial presumption lies with the debtor to show that international 
law forbids execution on an asset, this congressional finding would appear 
sufficient for a sovereign debtor to at least meet that burden in the first 
instance. 
CONCLUSION 
The dueling opinions in NML raised far more questions than they 
answered.  The Court’s holding was narrow:  the FSIA does not constrain 
discovery.  The language of the majority opinion, however, suggests an 
expansive view of transnational enforcement discovery, where creditors are 
entitled to know the full extent of the debtor’s assets before any other 
collateral issues are litigated.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent suggests a much 
more constrained role for transnational enforcement discovery, where 
courts will look inward to U.S. assets and U.S. law. 
The tealeaves left behind by the NML opinion do make one proposition 
quite clear:  transnational enforcement discovery has barely been explored 
 
 307. See generally Paul L. Hoffman, The “Blank Stare Phenomenon”:  Proving 
Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 181 (1996). 
 308. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 309. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012). 
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by U.S. courts.  Lower courts are struggling with an increasing volume of 
unpaid awards and judgments in which creditors are more than ever looking 
abroad for assets to seize and sell.310  The tools they have been handed were 
designed for the very different world of pretrial merits discovery. 
Enforcement discovery has its own purposes, presumptions, and problem.  
Enforcement discovery is necessarily separate from execution.  Courts can 
and should step fully into the role of guiding creditors on the worldwide 
search for assets.  Creditors should enjoy a strong presumption of 
enforcement discovery even in the face of obstacles such as restrictions on 
discovery or execution.  Only then can enforcement discovery effectuate the 
purposes of the transnational judgment and award enforcement system. 
 
 310. The title of the 2014 conference hosted by the Institute for Transnational Arbitration 
was “Modern Enforcement of Arbitral Awards:  ‘Show Me the Money.’” See INST. FOR 
TRANSNAT’L ARB., 26TH ANNUAL ITA WORKSHOP:  MODERN ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL 
AWARDS:  “SHOW ME THE MONEY” (2014), available at 
http://www.cailaw.org/media/files/ITA/EventBrochures/2014/ita-workshop.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2015). 
